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I.

INTRODUCTION

The development of the federal labor law dealing with the obligations of a successor corporate employer' based upon the predeces* Member, Illinois Bar. B.A., 1973, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio; J.D., 1977, Northwestern University. The research and original text of this manuscript were prepared under
the guidance of Professor Stephen B. Goldberg of the Northwestern University School of Law
Senior Research Program.
1. This Article deals only with true successor situations in which the new employer is a
bona fide successor to the previous employer. It does not deal with the case in which the:
successor corporation is the "alter ego" of the predecessor, where it is "merely a disguised
continuance of the old employer." Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106
(1942). Such cases involve a mere technical change in the structure or identity of the
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sor employer's collective bargaining agreement-the so-called
"successorship doctrine"-has been confusing, incomplete and,
apparently, inconsistent. The most likely explanation for this problem is that the courts and the National Labor Relations Board, in
dealing with the situation "where the identity of the employer
changes after the employees have won officially recognized collec-2
tive power to press their demands against their prior employer,"
have had to balance the interests of the various parties-the old
employer, the new employer, old and new employee groups, and
their unions-in an effort to achieve the "ultimate goal of national
labor policy to maximize both freedom of choice and economic stability for all interested parties while minimizing governmental in-

tervention. "3
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,4 NLRB v. Burns International
Security Services, Inc.,' and Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local
Joint Executive Board' have raised, but left unanswered, two significant questions regarding the proper balancing of the parties' interemploying entity, frequently to avoid the effect of the labor laws, without any substantial change in its ownership or management. In these circumstances, the courts have had
little difficulty holding that the successor is in reality the same employer and is subject
to all the legal and contractual obligations of the predecessor.
Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974).
2. Slicker, A Reconsiderationof the Doctrine of Employer Successorship-A Step Toward a RationalApproach, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (1973). Throughout this Article the successorship doctrine shall apply only to those labor laws and policies that deal with the successor
employer's obligations under the predecessor employer's labor contract.
3. Slicker, supra note 2, at 1052.
4. 376 U.S. 543 (1964), af'g 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963). Wiley evoked comment from
numerous authors. For thorough discussions of the decision and its implications, see Abodeely, The Effect of Reorganization, Merger or Acquisition on the Appropriate Bargaining
Unit, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 488 (1971); Doppelt, Successor Companies: The NLRB Limits
The Options-and Raises Some Problems, 20 DE PAuL L. REv. 176 (1970); Goldberg, The
Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 735 (1969); Patrick,
Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers, Collective Agreements, and
Arbitration, 18 S.C.L. REv. 413 (1966); Note, The Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate:
A Reconsideration of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HARV. L. REV. 418 (1968);
Note, The ContractualObligationsof a SuccessorEmployer Under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement of a Predecessor, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 914 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Contractual
Obligations of a Successor Employer].
5. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). For a thorough discussion of the Burns decision, see Bakaly &
Bryan, Survival of the BargainingAgreement: The Effect of Burns, 27 VAND. L. REV. 117
(1974); Morris & Gaus, Successorship and the Collective BargainingAgreement: Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. REV. 1359 (1973); Note, ContractRights and the Successor
Employer: The Impact of Burns Security, 71 MICH. L. REv. 571 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
The Impact of Burns Security].
6. 417 U.S. 249 (1974). For a thorough discussion of the Howard Johnson decision, see
Note, The Impact of HowardJohnson on the Labor Obligations of the Successor Employer,
74 MICH. L. REV. 555 (1976).
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ests: (1) does the successor employer's duty to arbitrate with the
union under the predecessor's contract survive a corporate change?;
and (2) if so, does the arbitrator have the power to impose the
substantive terms of the predecessor's labor agreement on the
successor?7
To answer these questions, this Article initially will analyze in
detail the three Supreme Court cases that have dealt with the duty
of a successor to arbitrate under its predecessor's labor agreement.
This inquiry will demonstrate that the Court has taken what ultimately can be described only as fundamentally inconsistent positions regarding a successor's duty to arbitrate and that the inconsistency is based, in part, upon a shift in emphasis from the policy of
preventing industrial strife toward the policy of promoting free
collective bargaining.
The second section of the Article will demonstrate theoretically
and empirically that the successorship rule formulated in John
Wiley & Sons best achieves both national labor policies of preventing industrial strife and promoting free collective bargaining. Furthermore, the examination of these cases will reveal that the inconsistency between Wiley and Burns results from erroneous legal analysis in Burns. Accordingly, the Court's opinion in Burns should be
rejected to the extent that it undermines the previous holding in
Wiley.
In the third and final section of the Article, some general guidelines will be proposed for arbitrators who must apply a predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement to the successor's employment situation, and the manner in which they should be applied in the ordinary successorship situation will be demonstrated.
II.

LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

A.

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston

In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,8 Interscience Publishers merged with John Wiley & Sons, another publishing firm, on
October 2, 1961, and ceased to do business as a separate entity. At
the time of the merger, Interscience was party to a collective bargaining agreement with District 65 of the Retail, Wholesale and
7. In light of the large number of corporate mergers and acquisitions that take place in
the United States, these questions are being asked with increasing frequency and their answers are acquiring great significance. In 1973, 874 corporate mergers and acquisitions took
place in manufacturing and mining. The number of corporate mergers and acquisitions per
year more than doubled between 1961 and 1969, although the number declined from 1970 to
1973. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 506 (1975).
8. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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Department Store Union, AFL-CIO. The agreement was not due to
expire until January 31, 1962, and covered forty of Interscience's
eighty employees. It did not contain a "successors and assigns"
clause, which expressly would have made the contract binding on
any successors of Interscience.5 All of the Interscience employees
were hired by Wiley and for approximately four months after the
merger they performed their same jobs at the same location. The
Interscience plant then was closed and the former Interscience employees transferred to the Wiley plant, where they were integrated
with the 300 Wiley employees, none of whom were represented by a
union.
In discussions before and after the merger, the Union and Interscience (and later Wiley) failed to reach an agreement concerning
the effect of the merger on the collective bargaining agreement and
on the rights of the employees covered by it. The Union asserted
that, despite the merger, the labor agreement remained in effect
and, therefore, that Wiley was obligated to abide by the Interscience
contract provisions dealing with seniority rights, contributions to
the Union fund, vacation and severance pay, job security, and grievances. The Union further claimed that these rights had "vested"
during the term of the Interscience agreement and that Wiley was
legally bound to recognize them even after the expiration of the
agreement. Wiley insisted that the Interscience bargaining agreement had been terminated by the merger and refused to recognize
the Union as the bargaining representative of the former Interscience employees or to agree to any of the Union's claims on their
behalf.
Pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Interscience labor
agreement, the Union instituted an action under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act 10 (LMRA) to compel Wiley to
9. A typical "successors and assigns" clause reads as follows:
SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS. This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties
hereto, their successors and assigns. It is the intent of the parties that the Agreement
shall remain in effect for the full term of the Agreement, and shall bind the successors
of the respective parties hereto.
Food Employees Local 590 v. National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. 875, 877 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
Numerous arbitrators have held that labor agreements containing "successors and assigns" clauses can be enforced against the successor employer without regard to the doctrine
of successorship. See, e.g., Lake States Leasing Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 935 (1966)
(Gundermann, Arb.); Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 44 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 346 (1965)
(Wallen, Arb.); Walker Bros., 41 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 844 (1963) (Crawford, Arb.);
Sigman Meat Co., 40 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 540 (1963) (Seligson, Arb.); C-F-M Co., 37
Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 980 (1962) (Kates, Arb.); Hess Oil & Chem. Co., 62-3 Lab. Arb.
Awards 8831 (1962) (Donnelly, Arb.). After Wiley, which did not involve a "successors and
assigns" clause, the presence or absence of such a clause is not determinative of whether the
successor will be bound by the predecessor's labor contract.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1962) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
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arbitrate the above-mentioned grievances. The district court denied
relief," but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
ordering arbitration.1 2 The Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals, holding that
the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into
a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement, and that, in appropriate circumstances, present here, the successor employer may be required to
arbitrate with the union under the agreement.' 3

In arriving at this conclusion, the Court initially reasoned that
Wiley could not be ordered to arbitrate unless the courts, not the
arbitrator,'4 found that Wiley was bound by the bargaining agreement's arbitration provision.' 5 Relying on "federal law, 'fashioned
from the policy of our national labor laws,'" the Court found Wiley
bound by the arbitration clause.' 6 In the Court's view, the national
labor policy of avoiding industrial strife best could be accomplished
by encouraging arbitration as the means for settling labor disputes
and by protecting employees from the potentially harmful effects of
17
a change in corporate ownership.
The Court specifically rejected Wiley's assertion that it could
11. 203 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
12. 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963).
13. 376 U.S. at 548.
14. The Court asserted:
The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration
cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining agreement does in
fact create such a duty. Thus, just as an employer has no obligation to arbitrate issues
which it has not agreed to arbitrate, so a fortiori, it cannot be compelled to arbitrate if
an arbitration clause does not bind it at all.
Id. at 547.
15. Id. at 545.
16. Id. at 548. The Union had relied on § 90 of the New York Stock Corporation Law,
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 906 (McKinney 1951), which provides that no "claim or demand for
any cause" against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation. In
reference to the Union's reliance on state law the Court asserted, "[state law may be
utilized so far as it is of aid in the development of correct principles or their application in a
particular case .

. .

. but the law which ultimately results is federal." 376 U.S. at 548.

17. The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles of
federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange
their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship. The
transition from one corporate organization to another will in most cas6s be eased and
industrial strife avoided if employees' claims continue to be resolved by arbitration
rather than by "the relative strength .. of the contending forces," Warrior & Gulf, 363
U.S. 574, 580.
The preference of national labor policy for arbitration as a substitute for tests of
strength between contending forces could be overcome only if other considerationscompellingly so demanded.
376 U.S. at 549-50 (emphasis added).
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not be required to arbitrate under Interscience's collective bargaining agreement because it was not a party to that contract and thus
had not agreed to be bound by the arbitration clause. In so holding,
the Court utilized a balancing test and found that "the impressive
policy considerations favoring arbitration are not wholly overborne
by the fact that Wiley did not sign the contract being construed."'"
Thus the Court expressly rejected the notion that the law governing
ordinary contracts applies to a collective bargaining agreement because such an agreement is not an ordinary contract. Instead, it is
a
generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot
wholly anticipate ....

The collective agreement covers the whole employ-

ment relationship. It calls into being a new common law-the common law of
a particular industry or of a particular plant .... Central to the peculiar
status and function of a collective bargaining agreement is the fact, dictated
both by circumstance . . . and by the requirements of the National Labor

Relations Act, that it is not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual
relationship."9

By attributing this unique character to the collective bargaining
agreement, the Court was able to conclude that Wiley's consent was
not necessary for the arbitration clause to bind it, but that such a
determination should be made according to the dictates of national
labor policy.2"
Although the Court ordered Wiley to arbitrate under the Interscience agreement, it explicitly refused to hold that the duty to
arbitrate survives every change of corporate ownership. A "lack of
any substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise
before and after a change" or a union's failure to make its claims
known would prohibit the imposition of such a duty.2 ' Wiley did not
18. Id. at 550.
19. Id.
20. Wiley further argued that the Union's claims were outside the scope of the arbitration clause because: (1) the agreement did not embrace post-merger claims; and (2) the
claims related to a period beyond the limited term of the agreement. The first argument was
dismissed summarily as previously having been decided. "It would be inconsistent with our
holding that the obligation to arbitrate survived the merger were we to hold that the fact of
the merger, without more, removed claims otherwise plainly arbitrable from the scope of the
arbitration clause." Id. at 554. In answer to Wiley's charge that the claims were beyond the
term of the contract, the Court noted that the original parties might have agreed to the
accrual of certain rights during the term of the contract that would not be realized until after
the contract's expiration. Whether this was the case and whether the Union's claims had any
merit were questions to be determined by the arbitrator, not the court. Id. at 555; see United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
21. 376 U.S. at 551. The Wiley Court made clear that a finding of "substantial continuity in the business enterprise before and after a change" in ownership is a prerequisite to
finding that the new employer is a successor for the purpose of imposing the duty to arbitrate.
Although this determination has been "shrouded in somewhat impressionistic approaches,"
International Ass'n of Machinists Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1135, 1139 (D.C. Cir.)
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fall within either of these exceptions; the Court found the requisite
continuity of identity in the "wholesale transfer of Interscience
employees to the Wiley plant" and recognized that the Union consistently had made its position clear."
B.

Wiley Progeny

The somewhat vague Wiley decision was soon applied by the
lower federal courts to similar successor situations,. Their various
interpretations of Wiley highlighted the uncertainty generated by
that decision. In Wackenhut Corp. v. Plant Guard Workers Local
151,3 two unions brought suit under section 301 of the LMRA to
compel Wackenhut to arbitrate grievances under a labor agreement
between the unions and General Plant Protection Company. Wackenhut was not a party to the agreement, but had purchased the
business and assets of General Plant and had hired almost all of
General Plant's former employees. The unions asserted that Wackenhut, as a successor employer, was required to honor its predecessor's labor contract and therefore was obligated to arbitrate grievances concerning labor agreement provisions that Wackenhut had
failed to put into effect. Wackenhut took the position that it was not
(Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 889 (1969), several evidentiary considerations have become relevant to the determination: (1) continuity in the work force; (2) continuity of the supervisory personnel; (3) continuity of business operations; (4) changes in the
internal operating method; (5) similarity of product or service; (6) continuity in the plant
location; and (7) existence of a hiatus in business operations. In considering these criteria,
the basic inquiry is whether the structure of the employing enterprise has been changed
sufficiently to alter the employees' perception of the employment relationship. Teamsters
Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956, 963 n.40 (3d Cir. 1974); Retail Clerks Local
1552 v. Lynn Drug Co., 299 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (S.D. Ohio 1969); Goldberg, supra note 4, at
747-55; Slicker supranote 2, at 1054-63. Until Howard Johnson the continuity of the composition of the work force had been merely one of several criteria to be considered. Howard
Johnson held that the hiring of a substantial number of the predecessor's employees is a
necessary, but not always sufficient, element for a finding of successorship. See text accompanying notes 57-71 infra.
22. 376 U.S. at 551. The Court specifically stated that it was not expressing any views
on a certified union's claim to continued representation after a change in corporate ownership
since the Union did not assert that it had any bargaining rights independent of the Interscience contract. The Court stated, however, that even if the Union did not represent a majority
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, this fact would not prevent the Union
from representing the employees covered by the agreement in dispute and out of which
Wiley's duty to arbitrate arose. The Court foresaw no conflict with other unions because
Wiley had no contract with any union covering the work force into which the former Interscience employees were integrated. Although the Court foresaw the possibility of problems
arising from an arbitral award granting preferential treatment to former Interscience employees, it felt that such a possibility did not warrant denying the union the right to arbitrate
the employees' claims. The Court had "little doubt that within the flexible procedures of
arbitration a solution can be reached which would avoid disturbing labor relations in the
Wiley plant." Id. at 552 n.5.
23. 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:249

a successor and thus was not bound by the labor agreement.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Wackenhut was a successor employer, finding irrelevant that the change in
corporate employers had resulted from a sale and purchase of assets,
rather than from a merger. 2 The court ordered Wackenhut to arbitrate with the unions, stating that:
The specific rule which we derive from Wiley is that where there is substantial
similarity of operation and continuity of identity of the business enterprise
before and after a change in ownership, a collective bargaining agreement
containing an arbitration provision, entered into by the predecessor employer
is binding upon the successor employer. 5

Wackenhut accordingly interpreted Wiley in two meaningful
ways. Initially, it established that Wiley was not to be limited to
merger situations, but quite to the contrary, suggested the broader
proposition that the technical form by which the change in employers occurs is irrelevant to the determination of whether the Wiley
principles will be applied.2 6 Furthermore, Wackenhut appears to
interpret Wiley as holding that a predecessor's entire labor contract
is binding on the successor, leaving only the interpretation and enforcement of that contract to the arbitrator.2 7 Since Wiley had required only that the successor honor the arbitration clause contained in the predecessor's contract, the extent to which other terms
of the contract could be enforced by either a court or an arbitrator
was left an open question.
24. Id. at 958.
25. Id.
26. Several courts and commentators agree with Wackenhut's reading of Wiley on this
point. United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968); Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967); McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966); Joint Bd. of Cloak, Skirt, and Dressmakers v. Senco, Inc., 310
F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1970); Retail Clerks Local 1552 v. Lynn Drug Co., 299 F. Supp. 1036
(S.D. Ohio 1969); Goldberg, supra note 4, at 751; Slicker, supra note 2, at 1062-63; Vernon,
Successorship and Collective Bargaining Agreements in Business Combinations and
Acquisitions, 24 VAND. L. REV. 903, 914-15 (1971).
27. Other courts and commentators have read the Wackenhut opinion in this fashion.
Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1974); International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Howmet Corp., 466 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1972); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Sangerman, The Labor Obligationsof the
Successor to a Unionized Business, 19 LAB. L.J. 160, 166 (1968); Slicker, supra note 2, at 1080;
Comment, The Impact of John Wiley Revisited-From the Vindication of Policy to the Verge
of Inequity, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 875, 882 (1970) [hereinafter cited as The Impact of John
Wiley Revisited]; Contractual Obligations of a Successor Employer, supra note 4, at 927;
Note, The Duties of Successor Employers Under John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston and Its
Progeny, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 498, 503 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The Duties of Successor
Employers]. But see Goldberg, supra note 4, at 775 (arguing that it is incorrect to read the
Wackenhut decision as holding that the entire labor contract survives).
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc.2 1 expressly rejected Wackenhut's
view that Wiley provided authority for imposing a predecessor's
entire labor agreement upon a successor. 29 In Reliance, the Federal
Trade Commission had ordered Martin Marietta Corporation to
divest itself of its Bridgeville, Pennsylvania plant. Accordingly,
Martin Marietta sold the plant as a going concern to Reliance Universal, Inc., which operated the plant without significant change
and hired virtually all of Martin Marietta's former employees. At
the time of the sale, Martin Marietta was a party to a collective
bargaining agreement with the Steelworkers Union. After Reliance
refused to abide by this agreement, the Union sued under section
301 of the LMRA, requesting both a declaratory judgment that the
predecessor's labor contract was binding on Reliance and an order
directing Reliance to arbitrate with the Union.
The circuit court ordered Reliance to arbitrate with the
Union,3" holding that, although it had become the new employer
via a purchase and sale of assets rather than a merger, Reliance
was still a successor. 3' Yet, the court staunchly refused to impose
the entire labor agreement upon the successor, stating that Wiley
did not support such a holding. Instead, the court read Wiley as expressing a concern that new circumstances, created by the change
in employers, might render certain contract terms negotiated by a
different party in different circumstances unreasonable or inequitable when imposed on a successor employer.32 The court stated
that the question whether a departure from certain provisions in
the predecessor's contract is justified by unusual circumstances
should be resolved by the arbitrator, not by the courts. In making
this decision the arbitrator should be authorized to "consider any
relevant new circumstances arising out of the change of ownership,
as well as the provisions of and practices under the old contract, in
achieving a just and equitable settlement of the grievance at
33
hand."
28. 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).
29. Id. at 895 n.3.
30. The Third Circuit argued:
So strong, in the [Wiley] Court's stated view, is the federal policy in favor of amicable
settlement of labor disputes by arbitration that the emerging federal common law of
labor relations requires a succeeding proprietor of a business to take the business subject
to a duty to arbitrate grievances, the existence and scope of that duty being defined by
whatever unexpired labor contract governed labor relations there at the time of the
change in ownership.
Id. at 894.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 895.
33. Id. Although the court felt that the arbitrator should have this flexibility, it asserted
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Reliance thus confirmed the conclusion that Wiley applied regardless of the technical form of the change in employers, reopened
the question whether other substantive terms of the predecessor's
contract might be automatically binding on a successor, and established flexible guidelines for arbitrators in successor situations."
C.

NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.

The next Supreme Court pronouncement on a successor employer's duties under a predecessor's labor contract came in NLRB
v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.35 In that case, the
Wackenhut Corporation had provided protection services to a Lockheed plant under a one-year service agreement. Several months
before this contract was to expire, the Wackenhut employees elected
and the Board certified the United Plant Guard Workers of America
(UPG) as their bargaining representative. The UPG then entered
into a three-year collective bargaining agreement with Wackenhut.
Upon the expiration of Wackenhut's service contract, Lockheed solicited competitive bids for the supplying of protection services to
its plant and received bids from both Wackenhut and Burns International Security Services. After notifying Burns of the existence of
a labor contract, Lockheed awarded it a one-year service contract.
Burns hired twenty-seven former Wackenhut guards and transferred fifteen of its own guards to Lockheed from other locations.
When Burns hired the Wackenhut employees, it supplied them with
membership cards of another union, the American Federation of
Guards (AFG), and informed them that they would not be hired
unless they joined the AFG. Burns recognized the AFG as the bargaining representative on the theory that a majority of their employees had signed AFG membership cards. The UPG demanded that
Burns recognize it as the employees' bargaining representative and
that Burns honor the collective bargaining agreement between the
UPG and Wackenhut. When Burns refused, the UPG filed unfair
labor practice charges with the NLRB.
The UPG charged and the NLRB found that Burns had committed unfair labor practices by unlawfully recognizing and assisting the AFG, a rival union of the UPG, 31 by failing to recognize and
that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement would still be the basic guide to the
law of the shop at the Bridgeville plant. Id.
34. The Reliance court's establishment of arbitral guidelines emphasizes the absence
of any such standards in Wiley. The only guideline suggested by the Wiley Court to aid the
arbitrator in determining the effect of the merger on the collective bargaining agreement was
an examination of "whether or not the merger was a possibility considered by Interscience
and the Union during the negotiation of the contract." 376 U.S. at 557.
35. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
36. This conduct violated §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act,
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bargain with the UPG,3 7 and by failing to honor the existing labor
contract between the UPG and Wackenhut. 3 Accordingly, the

NLRB ordered Burns to bargain with the UPG and to honor its
predecessor's labor agreement29 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Board's bargaining order, but reversed the
order to honor the labor contract holding that such an order exceeded the Board's power."' The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals."
In upholding the order to bargain, the Court found that the
Lockheed plant was the appropriate bargaining unit42 and that the
UPG, recently certified as the bargaining representative of all the
employees in that unit, still represented a majority of those employees.4" The Court held, however, that the NLRB erred in finding that
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(2) (1970) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
37. This conduct violated NLRA §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5)
(1970).
38. This conduct also violated NLRA §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1),
158(a)(5) (1970). Instead of implementing the terms of the predecessor's contract, Burns
established its own terms of employment.
39. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970). There were
three companion cases to Burns: Hackney Iron & Steel Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 357 (1970) (successor's failure to honor the predecessor's contract violated NLRA § 8(a)(5)); Kota Div. of Dura
Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 360 (1970) (successor who assumed the predecessor's labor contract could
not be compelled to negotiate a new contract with the union); Travelodge Corp., 182 N.L.R.B.
370 (1970) (new employer held not to be a successor).
40. 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971). Burns did not appeal the Board's finding of unlawful
assistance to a union.
41. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
42. Id. at 278. The Court based this conclusion upon the trial examiner's finding,
adopted by the NLRB, that the Lockheed plant was the appropriate bargaining unit. Justice
Rehnquist pointed out in dissent that the trial examiner's finding on this issue depended upon
a previous stipulation concerning the appropriate bargaining unit between the UPG and
Wackenhut. Id. at 297.
43. This conclusion was based on the representation by the UPG of a majority of Burns'
employees and on the recent certification by the NLRB of the UPG as their bargaining
representative. When the UPG was certified, it became the exclusive bargaining agent of all
Wackenhut employees in the unit, even those who voted against it. Thus the UPG represented
a majority of the employees in the Burns bargaining unit because a majority of those employees were former Wackenhut guards.
Furthermore, Board certification carries with it an almost conclusive presumption of
continued majority status for a reasonable period, usually a year. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S.
96 (1954). The Court noted that a mere change of employers does not affect the force of a
Board certification order. 406 U.S. at 279. The UPG's majority status, therefore, could not
be attacked until one year after the Board's certification. See Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB,
495 F.2d 1131, 1138-39 (7th Cir. 1974); Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1964); Doppelt,
supra note 4, at 181. Justice Rehnquist dissented from this conclusion claiming that "it is by
no means mathematically demonstrable that the union was the choice of a majority of the
42 employees with which Burns began the performance of its contract with Lockheed." 406
U.S. at 297. This comment seems to disregard all of the effects of certification mentioned
above.
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Burns' failure to honor its predecessor's contract constituted an
unfair labor practice and in ordering Burns to honor that contract. 44
Relying on H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,45 the Court reasoned that
section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which
prohibits the Board from "compel[ling] either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession,"" prevented the
NLRB from imposing the substantive terms of a predecessor's contract on a successor employer. 7
The NLRB urged that Wiley, with its emphasis on the peaceful
settlement of industrial disputes and the protection of employees'
contractual rights, required Burns to abide by the terms of its predecessor's labor agreement. 8 In response to this argument, the Court
specifically found that Wiley did not control the particular facts at
issue. The Burns Court distinguished Wiley on the basis of its different procedural context, stating that "Wiley arose in the context of
a §301 suit to compel arbitration, not in the context of an unfair
labor practice proceeding where the Board is expressly limited by
the provisions of §8(d). ' '41 Moreover, the Court pointed out that
44. 406 U.S. at 291. The Court did suggest, however, that in some circumstances the
Board properly might find, as a matter of fact, that a successor employer had assumed
obligations under the predecessor's contract. Such a duty, however, would not arise as a
matter of law. Id.
45. 397 U.S. 99 (1970). In Porterthe Board found that the employer had committed the
unfair labor practice of failing to bargain with the union by adamantly rejecting a dues checkoff provision. As a remedy, the Board ordered the employer to agree to the provision. The
Supreme Court agreed that the employer had violated the Act, but held that the Board had
no power to impose a substantive contract term upon one of the parties.
46. Section 8(d) of the NLRA reads in pertinent part as follows:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representatives of the employees to meet . . . and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract
covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively
shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract
29 U.S.C. § 15,8(d) (1970).
47. 406 U.S. at 282-83. Further support for this interpretation of § 8(d) is found in its
legislative history and in Congress' constant refusal to interfere with free collective bargaining
in numerous other contexts. Also, the Court noted that, prior to Burns, the NLRB consistently had held that successor employers are not bound by their predecessor's collective
bargaining contracts. Id. at 284; see Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1242 n.15 (1964); Slater
Sys. Md., Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 865, 866 (1961); General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165, 1168
(1958).
48. Burns was the first proceeding in which the Board applied Wiley to a § 8(a)(5)
refusal to bargain charge. 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970). The Board previously had refused to do
so. See Glenn Goulding, 165 N.L.R.B. 202 (1967); Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1486
(1967), enforced, 402 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969); Rinker
Materials Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 1670 (1967).
49. 406 U.S. at 285.
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Wiley rested upon the national labor policy favoring arbitration and
therefore only ordered the successor employer to arbitrate with the
union. The Court further noted that Wiley dealt with a merger
taking place against a background of state law that imposed liability on a successor corporation for its predecessor's obligations, 0
whereas the two companies in Burns were competitors who had had
no prior dealings with each other.
On a more fundamental level, the Court rejected Wiley's applicability by asserting that, although preventing industrial strife was
a major goal of national labor policy, Congress had not totally subordinated the bargaining freedom of employers and employees to that
goal." The Court felt that imposing the predecessor's contract on
the successor not only would impinge on the parties' right to free
collective bargaining, but also would create many serious inequities
that might unduly injure or restrict the parties in conducting their
business operations. Thus, in support of its result, the Court dis52
cussed various policy issues raised by the successorship situation.
For instance, the Court expressed a major concern that imposing a
predecessor's labor contract on a new employer might discourage
corporations from acquiring moribund businesses, thereby impeding the free transfer of assets. In turn, employees whose unions had
made concessions to failing employers would not be able to reap the
benefits of a new and more prosperous employer. The Court also felt
that, if the successor were required to honor the predecessor's labor
contract, the predecessor's employees would be deemed employees
of the successor, dischargable only in accordance with the contract.
The employer thus would not be free to select his own employees,
but would be obligated to accord seniority rights, vacation privileges, and retirement fund benefits to the predecessor's employees.
Finally, the successor employer would be unable to compel the
union to bargain for a modification of the contract before its expiration date and would be prohibited from disputing, even in good
faith, the union's majority status during the term of the contract.53
In accordance with its holding prohibiting the Board from imposing the predecessor's contract on Burns, the Court held that
Burns was not guilty of unilaterally changing the terms or condi50. Id. at 286; see note 16 supra.
51. 406 U.S. at 287.
52. For a critique of these policies, see text accompanying notes 164-95 infra.
53. The "contract bar" rule is imposed by the Board for the term of a collective bargaining agreement of "reasonable duration," a period now defined as three years. General Cable
Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
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tions of employment 4 because as a new employer "it had no previous relationship whatsoever to the bargaining unit and . . .no
outstanding terms and conditions of employment from which a
change could be inferred."5" Only when the new employer's intention to hire all of the former employees is "perfectly clear" would
the new employer be required to consult with the union before determining the initial terms of employment."
D.

Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board

The most recent Supreme Court statement regarding a successor's duties under his predecessor's labor agreement came in
Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board.57 In
that case, the predecessor employer, the Grissoms, operated a motor
lodge and restaurant under a franchise agreement with Howard
Johnson. The Grissoms had entered into two collective bargaining
agreements with two unions, one covering the lodge employees, the
other covering the restaurant employees." Both agreements contained arbitration provisions and "successors and assigns" clauses.59
Prior to the expiration of either agreement, the Grissoms agreed to
sell all the assets of the motor lodge and restaurant and to lease the
real property to Howard Johnson. When Howard Johnson began
operating the business, it hired forty-five employees, only nine of
whom previously had been employed by the Grissoms, who prior to
the sale had fifty-three employees.
54. This conduct would have violated NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
55. 406 U.S. at 294.
56. Id. at 295. In a vigorous dissent written on behalf of four members of the Court,
Justice Rehnquist argued that the bargaining order and the order to honor the contract should
be overturned. Disputing the majority's finding of successorship upon which the bargaining
order rested, Justice Rehnquist insisted that successorship can be found only when contractual dealings have occurred between the two employers. Id. at 296, 306. The mere shifting of
employees between Wackenhut and Burns, Justice Rehnquist felt, was too attenuated a
relationship to warrant imposing the obligations of successorship upon Burns.
In the same vein, Justice Rehnquist attacked the order to honor the contract, stating
that:
If we deal with the legitimate expectations of employees that the employer who agreed
to the collective-bargaining contract perform it, we can require another employing entity
to perform the contract only when he has succeeded to some of the tangible or intangible
assets by the use of which the employees might have expected the first employer to have
performed his contract with them.
Id. at 305.
57. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
58. As the Court pointed out, although these two unions bore different names, they were
identical in interest and governance. They thus were treated as a single union. Id. at 251 n.1.
59. See note 9 supra.
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After Howard Johnson refused to recognize the unions or to
assume any obligations under the labor agreements, the unions filed
suit under section 301 of the LMRA.10 The unions characterized
Howard Johnson's failure to hire all of Grissom's former employees
as a "lockout" in violation of the labor contract and sought an order
compelling arbitration. The district court's order directing Howard
Johnson to arbitrate under its predecessor's contract61 was affirmed
by the Sixth Circuit, 2 but was reversed by the Supreme Court. 3 The
Supreme Court recognized that the reasoning of Wiley appeared
inconsistent with the approach taken in Burns.6" Yet, the Court
found it unnecessary to determine whether any "irreconcilable conflict" existed between those two decisions because it felt that not
even Wiley would support an order to arbitrate under the circumstances. Holding that the "substantial continuity of identity in the
business enterprise"-a prerequisite to ordering a successor to arbitrate-"necessarily includes . . . a substantial continuity in the
identity of the work force across the change in ownership," 66 the
Court found such continuity lacking because Howard Johnson had
hired only nine of Grissom's fifty-three employees. The Court further supported its holding by asserting that the successor had no
obligation to hire any of the predecessor's employees.67
Pointing out that Wiley involved a merger, whereas a purchase
and sale of assets was here at issue, the Court enunciated two additional reasons why Wiley was not controlling. First, in Wiley the
New York merger statute imposed the obligations of a predecessor
on the successor corporation. 8 Thus, the successor and the employees in Wiley reasonably should have expected that they would be
bound to arbitrate under the predecessor's contract. No similar
60. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
61. 81 L.R.R.M. 2329 (1972).
62. 482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973).
63. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
64. For a discussion of the inconsistency, see text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
65. 417 U.S. at 256.
66. Id. at 263. The Court felt that the Wiley Court recognized this requirement by
resting its finding of continuity upon the "wholesale transfer" of Interscience employees to
Wiley.
67. Because the Union argued that the predecessor's labor contract required Howard
Johnson to hire all of the former Grissom employees, the Court felt that the Union was not
seeking arbitration to protect the rights of the Howard Johnson employees, but rather, was
acting on behalf of the Grissom employees who were not hired by Howard Johnson. The
Union's assertion is at odds with the basic principles of labor law that establish that Howard
Johnson had the right not to hire any former Grissom employees as long as it did not base
its hiring decisions on union membership. Id. at 261-62.
68. See note 16 supra.
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finding could be made in Howard Johnson. Second, the merging
corporation in Wiley disappeared, leaving the employees without
means of enforcing their contract unless they were given a remedy
against Wiley. In Howard Johnson, however, the Court felt the employees had an effective means by which to enforce their labor
agreement since the seller remained a viable entity with substantial
assets. 9
Although the Court refused to attempt a reconciliation of Wiley
and Burns, it did rebuke the lower courts for holding Burns inapplicable because it dealt with an NLRB order, whereas Wiley and
the present case involved section 301 suits to compel arbitration.
The Court stated that
[i]t would be plainly inconsistent .
to say that the basic policies found
controlling in an unfair labor practice context may be disregarded by the
courts in a suit under §301, and thus to permit the rights enjoyed by the new
employer in a successorship context to depend upon the forum in which the
union presses its claims. 0

Accordingly, the Court held that the principles of both Wiley and
Burns applied to successorship issues."
E. The Unanswered Questions
This line of cases leaves a number of questions unanswered.
The most fundamental of these emanates from the apparently contradictory holdings of Wiley and Burns. In ordering the successor to
arbitrate, the Wiley Court specifically declared that national labor
policy was not to be thwarted by basic principles of ordinary contract law. The Court determined that arbitration was a means of
avoiding industrial strife and protecting the contractual rights of
the employees that outweighed the fact that Wiley was not a signatory to the contract. The inescapable implication of Wiley's arbitration order is that other substantive terms of a predecessor's contract
potentially are binding on the successor. It is inconceivable that the
Court would have ordered Wiley to arbitrate the Union's claims
under the predecessor's labor agreement unless the arbitrator had
69. Indeed, the Grissoms had conceded their obligation to arbitrate with the union in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreements they had signed. 417 U.S. at 253.
70. Id. at 256. Although it rejected the lower court's differing treatment of NLRB orders
and § 301 suits, the Court acknowledged that the distinction had been suggested by the Burns
Court.
71. The Court felt that its decision requiring a substantial continuity of the work force
in order to find successorship for arbitration purposes accommodated both Wiley's concern
for protecting employee interests in a change of ownership and Burns' emphasis on the new
employer's right to operate the business with his own independent work force. Id. at 264.
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the power both to find the predecessor's contract terms binding on
72
the successor and to find the successor in violation of those terms.
In stark contrast to this position, the natural inference from
Burns is that none of the predecessor's contract terms, includingthe
arbitration clause, could be imposed upon an unconsenting successor. Burns reflects a shift in the Court's emphasis from a concern
with avoiding industrial strife and protecting employee rights toward a preference for free collective bargaining and the unimpeded
transfer of assets.7 3 Although refusing to address this inconsistency,
the Court in Howard Johnson cast some doubt upon the future
vitality of Wiley by limiting that case to its specific facts and by
emphasizing the right of a purchaser to make appropriate changes
in a business, including the hiring of his own independent work
force.
Although it is clear that Wiley has not been overruled expressly, 74 the ultimate effect of the Burns decision on the continued
viability of Wiley has yet to be determined. 75 The question remains
72. There is a virtual consensus that this is the necessary implication of Wiley. See
Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d at 960 n.20; United Steelworkers v.
United States Gypsum Co., 339 F. Supp. 302, 306 (N.D. Ala. 1972), rev'd on othergrounds,
492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1974); United States Gypsum Co., 56 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 363,
388 (1971) (Valtin, Arb.); Shaw & Carter, Sales, Mergers and Union Contract Relations, 19
N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 357, 370 (1967); 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 193, 199 (1972);
21 U. KA. L. REv. 97, 104 (1972). In a recent decision, Bartenders Local 340 v. Howard
Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit refused to impose a predecessor's labor agreement on a successor, apparently rejecting this interpretation. For a full
discussion of this decision, see note 155 infra.
73. The Board recognized this shift in emphasis in its recent decision, Lone Star Steel
Co., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1977), which held that a "successors and assigns" clause is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The Board stated "it is clear that the general
rules governing successorship [enunciated in Burns] guarantee neither employees' wages nor
their jobs."
74. The Supreme Court in Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers,
430 U.S. 243 (1977), relied on Wiley in holding that an employer is required to arbitrate a
contractual dispute even though the dispute arose after the collective bargaining agreement
had expired.
75. As is highlighted by the decisions in Bartenders Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co.
and Lone Star Steel Co., the question of Burns' effect on Wiley's viability is a question of
some immediacy with no clear answer. In BartendersLocal 340 v. Howard Johnson Co. the
Union put this question into issue. Although the court declined to decide the question, it
noted that the issue whether Wiley survived Burns was undecided. For a discussion of this
case, see note 155 infra. The uncertain state of the law regarding a successor's obligations
under its predecessor's labor agreement was emphasized by the Board's disagreement in Lone
Star Steel Co. regarding the holding that a "successors and assigns" clause is a mandatory
bargaining issue. The dissent asserted that this holding would "achieve precisely what the
Burns court sought to avoid." One court, however, appears at first blush to have decided that
Wiley remains controlling precedent. In an ambiguous and conclusory opinion, the court in
Lathers Local 104 v. McGlynn Plastering, Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3000 (W.D. Wash. 1976), utilized
language which could be interpreted as imposing the arbitration clause of a predecessor's
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whether courts in the future may order a successor employer to
arbitrate under his predecessor's labor agreement and, if the courts
may do so, whether and to what extent an arbitrator may impose
other substantive terms of the contract upon the successor. Furthermore, as highlighted by Reliance, guidelines are needed to aid the
arbitrator in determining which provisions of the predecessor's contract survive and how those provisions should be interpreted with
76
regard to the new employer.
HI.

A.

DEVELOPING ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS

Equitable Accommodation of Goals of National Labor Policy
Through Arbitration

An attempt to resolve the questions whether courts may now
require a successor to arbitrate under his predecessor's contract and
whether an arbitrator may impose other substantive terms of the
contract necessarily involves consideration of the issue, initially
dealt with in Wiley, of whether such obligations should be imposed.
The federal courts' mandate is to develop a federal common law
regarding enforcement of collective bargaining agreements
"fashioned from the policy of our national labor laws. 7 7 Because the
collective bargaining agreement upon a successor. In that case, a grievance arose between the
Union and the original employer, McGlynn Plastering, a proprietorship. The Union took the
dispute to arbitration at which the employer defaulted. The arbitratiori award granted in
favor of the Union provided that it would be binding on the employer or its successor.
Subsequently, the proprietorship was incorporated and became McGlynn Plastering, Inc. The
Union brought suit to enforce the arbitration award against the corporation. The court denied
a motion for summary judgment because there had been no showing that the corporation was
a successor employer bound by the contract of a predecessor under § 301 of the NLRA. Later,
relying on uncontroverted affidavits and Wiley, the court concluded the corporation was a
"successor" to the proprietorship because there was a "continuity of operation across the
change of ownership" in that the proprietorship had transferred its name, assets, good will,
and licenses to the corporation. Accordingly, the court enforced the arbitrator's award against
the corporate employer.
Despite this court's language, it would be serious error to rely upon McGlynn Plastering
as support for Wiley's continued vitality. First, as a successorship case, it is an inaccurate,
incomplete statement of the law; without any mention of Burns or HowardJohnson, the court
states that a successor will be bound by a predecessor's contract. Second, even the very brief,
vague facts contained in the opinion reveal that this is not a true "successor" situation, but
instead is an alter ego problem. See note 1 supra.The first employer, a proprietorship, merely
was incorporated. There had been no meaningful change in the identity of the employer, only
a technical change in the structure of the employing entity. Thus, the arbitration award
properly should have been enforced against the corporation as an alter ego. Also, if the
corporate employer were to be considered a successor, it should be meaningful in this case
only because language of the arbitration award was by its own terms binding only on a
successor.
76. For a discussion of Reliance, see text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
77. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). See also Teamsters Local
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national labor policies relating to the successorship issue are inherently conflicting, the answer depends upon whether the national
labor policies that are furthered by imposing obligations on the
successor outweigh the labor policies that are impinged upon by
enforcing such obligations. This determination requires an analysis
of the specific facts of each case, as well as the interests of the
parties, and their effects on the objectives of national labor policy. 78
Imposing the duty to arbitrate on a successor greatly enhances both
the labor policy of preventing industrial strife and that of promoting
freedom of choice, whereas it results in only minimal governmental
interference with the free collective bargaining process. Accordingly, an equitable balance between these competing policies favors
requiring the successor to arbitrate his future obligations under his
predecessor's contract with the union.7 9
(1)

Preventing Industrial Strife and Promoting Freedom of Choice

Although the goal of preventing industrial strife is basic to our
national labor policy, it generally has not been urged as a basis for
interfering with free collective bargaining."0 In light of the separatebut-equal co-existence of these two goals, the difficult question becomes how an even minimal interference with free collective bargaining can be justified in a successor situation. The answer, simply
stated, is that the risk of industrial strife is substantially greater in
the case of a successor employer than it is in the normal bargaining
context, and imposition of the predecessor's labor agreement may
174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
78. This method of analysis was suggested by the Court in HowardJohnson:
[T]he real question in each of these "successorship" cases is, on the particular facts,
what are the legal obligations of the new employer to the employees of the former owner
or their representative? The answer to this inquiry requires analysis of the interests of
the new employer and the employees and of the policies of the labor laws in light of the
facts of each case and the particular legal obligation which is at issue, whether it be the
duty to recognize and bargain with the union, the duty to remedy unfair labor practices,
the duty to arbitrate, etc.
417 U.S. at 262-63 n.9.
79. At least one other commentator has arrived at a similar conclusion. See Stern,
Binding the Successor Employer to Its Predecessor'sCollectiveAgreement Under the NLRA,
45 TEmp. L.Q. 1, 34-35 (1971).
80. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l, 361 U.S. 477, 488-90 (1960); NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-03 (1952). See also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. at
103; Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962); United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582; Swerdlow, Freedom of Contract in Labor Laws:
Burns, H.K. Porter, and Section 8(d), 51 TEx. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1972). For a discussion of
Congress' persistent refusal to interfere with the process of free collective bargaining by
imposing compulsory arbitration, see Goldberg, supra note 4, at 742-73.
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be necessary to avert its occurrence.
Industrial instability from either strikes and other means of
economic disruption or continuous litigation is very likely to result
from a wholly unanticipated termination of employees' contract
rights following a change in employer. Employees normally expect
the rights and benefits afforded them under their collective bargaining agreement to continue until its expiration date. A unilateral,
premature termination of their contract naturally would foster a
sense of insecurity among the employees about any future contracts
and reasonably could be expected to breed resentment and ill will
against the new employer.8" New contract negotiations, during a
period in which no contract exists, would present the employees
with a gap in the terms and conditions of their employment and
would subject them to an uncertain future, thus jeopardizing the
stability of labor relations.82 Furthermore, permitting a successor
employer to flout the employees' previously negotiated contract and
to require the union to expend additional time and money negotiating a new contract, with all the uncertainties that attend the process, is likely to anger the union and the employees. Bargaining
negotiations therefore would be more difficult, the possibility of
agreement would be reduced, and the likelihood of a strike would
be greatly increased.83
An order requiring arbitration, with the implication that other
contract terms might bind the successor, would avoid industrial
strife by protecting the employees' expectations from the effects of
a sudden change in their employer's business over which the employees have absolutely no control. 4 This restriction on the new
employer's right to arrange his business freely cannot be justified as
a means of protecting employees' substantive rights. Rather, the
restriction is warranted because it is the best means of achieving
industrial peace, but is a valid approach only as long as it is a
necessary and effective means of achieving that goal. The protection
of employee rights is merely incidental to accomplishing this ultimate goal. 5 Use of the "substantial continuity" test 6 to determine
the question of successorship assures that neither the employing
enterprise nor the employment relationship has been changed
81. 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 193, 206-07 (1972).
82. Fed-Mart, 165 N.L.R.B. 202 (1967); Goldberg, supra note 4, at 811.
83. Doppelt, supra note 4, at 184-85.
84. See Note, ContractualSuccessorship: The Impact of Bums, 40 U. CI. L. REV. 617,
621-22 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ContractualSuccessorship].
85. For a similar view, see id. at 627.
86. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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greatly. Former employees of the predecessor hired by the successor
would view their job situations as substantially unaltered and would
expect and demand no more and no less than fulfillment of the
provisions of their contract. 7 Meeting these expectations would encourage stability in the employment relationship by generating respect and good will between the parties and by avoiding confrontations that lead to frustration, anger, distrust, and ultimately to
labor unrest.m
Imposing the predecessor's labor contract on the successor is a
necessary means of achieving industrial stability by protecting employees' legitimate expectations because it is the only effective
means by which employees can enforce their rights under their
collective bargaining agreement. Employee interests are not represented in take-over negotiations.8 ' In fact, in the majority of mergers, acquisitions, or purchases of assets, employees are unaware of
the pending change of employer until they are notified by the predecessor employer that their employment is soon to be terminated.'0
As one commentator has stated: "Even where the employee learns
of an impending change, he is largely without effective power, even
through his union representative, to bring his overwhelming interests to bear on the employer's plans.""
87. "There is no reason to believe that the employees will change their attitude merely
because the identity of their employer has changed." NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800,803 (7th
Cir. 1952) (concerning successor's duty to bargain with union); William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. at 349.
88. "The substantial continuity test serves the interests of employee job security and
industrial stability by meeting employee expectations." The Impact of Burns Security, supra
note 5, at 587. See also Goldberg, supra note 4, at 749.
89. As pointed out by the Wiley Court,
[e]mployees, and the union which represents them, ordinarily do not take part in
negotiations leading to a change in corporate ownership. The negotiations will ordinarily
not concern the well-being of the employees, whose advantage or disadvantage, potentially great, will inevitably be incidental to the main considerations.
376 U.S. at 549.
90. See, e.g., Wackenhut Corp. v. Plant Guard Workers Local 151, 332 F.2d 954 (9th
Cir. 1964) (purchase agreement entered into three months before union was notified of sale);
Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Joden, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 390
(D. Mass. 1966) (union notified two weeks before sale of assets); Retail Store Employees Local
954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (employees notified one
day prior to sale of assets).
91. Slicker, supra note 2, at 1052. If employees do become aware of a possible transaction, the only means by which they might protect themselves against a future change in
employer depends entirely on the existence of a "successors and assigns" clause in their
existing contract. Relying upon such a clause, the union possibly could sue successfully to
enjoin the anticipated merger or sale of assets until the question whether the predecessor must
require the successor to honor the labor contract is arbitrated. In Food Employees Local 590
v. National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Pa. 1972), the employer had negotiated a
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After the change in employer has taken place, only the successor employer can provide an effective remedy for the employees.
This is true in mergers ana acquisitions because the predecessor
corporation disappears. Despite suggestions to the contrary,9 2 a
predecessor that continues in existence following a purchase and
sale of assets is incapable of providing total and effective remedies
for meritorious union claims.93 The only relief that the predecessor
could provide is monetary damages for such claims as those involving severance pay, accrued vacation benefits, and pension plan contributions.94 Claims of much more vital concern to the employees,
involving, for example, continued employment, discharge without
just cause, and violation of seniority rights can be honored and
remedied only by the successor employer, who has acquired the
assets and is operating the business.95 The union should be free to
arbitrate its claims with the party who can provide meaningful,
effective relief for the union's meritorious claims.
Furthermore, imposing the predecessor's contract creates industrial stability and continuity by providing a smooth transition
from one employer to another. This is achieved by retaining the
tentative agreement for the sale of 36 of its stores. The agreement did not contain a clause
binding the successor to the existing contract between the Union and the employer, which
included a "successors and assigns" clause. The court ordered the employer to arbitrate the
Union's claims and issued an injunction, pending enforcement of the arbitrator's award,
prohibiting the employer from consummating a contract for the sale of his stores unless it
made the existing labor contract binding on the successor. Similarly, the court in National
Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 325 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), enforced an
arbitration award which forbade the employer from selling one of his ships unless the purchaser agreed to honor the employer's collective bargaining agreement, which included a
"successors and assigns" clause.
Whether the union finally succeeds in the arbitration proceeding depends upon the
arbitrator's interpretation of the "successors and assigns" clause. In Dawn Farms Corp., 661 Lab. Arb. Awards 3529 (1965) (Wolff, Arb.), the arbitrator held that a "successors and
assigns" clause obligated the predecessor to assure that the new employer would honor the
labor contract. In direct contrast, the "successors and assigns" clause in C-F-M Co., 37 Lab.
Arb. & Disp. Settl. 980 (1962) (Kates, Arb.), was interpreted as binding the successor to the
contract, but as imposing no obligation on the predecessor to see that the successor was
bound.
92. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. at 257-58;
McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d at 353; Retail Store Employees Local 954 v.
Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. at 659.
93. Courts have held that, even though the predecessor's contract might be binding on
the successor, the predecessor is still bound by his labor contract with the union. Although
the predecessor cannot provide an adequate remedy for the employees, the union still can
compel him to arbitrate alleged violations of the contract. Local 82, United Packinghouse
Workers v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 430 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1970); District Lodge 71,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. McIntosh Motors, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
94. Food Employees Local 590 v. National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. at 882.
95. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 755.
96. See ContractualSuccessorship, supra note 84, at 621-22; Note, Labor Law-Effect
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labor contract that best accommodates the needs of the parties and
thereby promotes tranquility. The benefits of free collective bargaining emanate from the familiarity of the bargaining parties with
the working environment and the problems of the plant because
these parties are best equipped to solve those problems and to establish contract terms beneficial to both sides. 7 The predecessor's contract is a product of just such an arrangement. The union and the
predecessor negotiated the contract knowing details regarding employees, working conditions, and past practices at the plant and
formulated a contract to meet the needs and peculiarities of that
particular situation. Again, remembering that the "continuity of
business identity" test assures that no meaningful change in the
plant's operations or in the employment relationship has occurred,
it is valid to assume that the predecessor's contract remains the
most appropriate charter for regulating the working environment of
the business.
Moreover, free collective bargaining taking place at the beginning of a new employer-employee relationship is of little value as an
exercise of freedom of choice. Since the union's experience with the
employer is insignificant, it has no basis upon which to determine
if its choice of contract terms should be altered or in what manner
and to what degree they should be changed. The employer, in addition to being unfamiliar with the union, would be unfamiliar with
the plant, its method of operations, its employees, and its past
practices. Thus it would be difficult for him to know what contract
on Successor Employer of Predecessor'sCollective BargainingAgreement, 86 HARv. L. REv.
247, 250-51 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Effect on Successor Employer]; 21 U. KAN. L. REv.
97, 99-101 (1972).
97. See N. CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 463-64 (1951); J. DuNLOP, COLLEMCE
BARGAINING: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 29-34 (1949).
In his dissenting opinion in the Board's Burns decision, Member Jenkins argued:
Our goal should be to permit the parties flexibility in working out their new arrangements, if either desires to do so, rather than to impose the existing contract when one
side may be seriously dissatisfied with it. The new employer is not a party to the contract
and the union did not join in shaping and executing it with his circumstances in mind.
Thus, to impose the contract on the new relation may in cases prove a source of friction
and disruption rather than stability.
182 N.L.R.B. at 351 (Jenkins, dissenting). This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, allowing either party unilaterally to end the contract creates a great degree of uncertainty, which leads to instability in the industry. Second, the risk of economic warfare is
substantial since the parties would begin negotiations from directly opposite positions-one
desiring to retain the predecessor's contract, the other refusing to do so. Third, the requirement of substantial continuity in the business before and after the change in employers
assures that no significant change has occurred in the business operations and that the
predecessor's contract will accommodate satisfactorily the needs and interests of both parties
for the remaining period of the contract.
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terms would accommodate most efficiently and satisfactorily that
particular working environment in order to promote stable business
operations in the future. Since collective bargaining in this context
generally would be meaningless as an expression of free choice and
because no real basis exists for assuming that a change in contract
terms would be beneficial to either party, the predecessor's contract
should be imposed.
In contrast, bargaining negotiations conducted upon the termination of the predecessor's contract would promote both freedom of
choice and industrial stability. After the parties have "lived" with
each other for the remaining period of the predecessor's contract,
their increased familiarity with each other and additional understanding of the working environment would render bargaining negotiations a significant opportunity for expressing their free choice.
Also, this increased familiarity would enhance the likelihood that
they will reach an agreement successfully without a strike.
The predictability and certainty that would result from a rule
requiring the successor to arbitrate under the predecessor's contract
also would reduce potential conflicts and confrontations and, accordingly, would promote stability." From the outset, the parties
98. Several commentators have emphasized the need for predictability in the successorship situation and have criticized Burns for creating uncertainty. See Abodeely, supra note
4, at 530; ContractualSuccessorship, supra note 84, at 621-22. As the law stands now, a rule
imposing the predecessor's labor contract on the successor still would not achieve absolute
predictability. A degree of uncertainty would remain because the standards for determining
successorship are not absolutely clear. The holding in Howard Johnson establishing that a
"substantial continuity of the work force" is necessary to find successorship aids in creating
clearer guidelines. Still, the question of how many or what percentage of the predecessor's
employees must be hired by the successor to constitute substantial continuity remains.
On February 1, 1977, Senate Labor Committee Chairman Harrison Williams (D-N.J.)
introduced a bill (S. 528) that would amend § 8(d) of the NLRA to: (1) make a new employer's
refusal to assume all the terms of his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement an unfair
labor practice; (2) explicitly empower the Board to order the successor to honor the predecessor's contract; and (3) create federal court jurisdiction over suits alleging a violation of the
assumed contract.
When introducing his bill, Senator Williams charged the Supreme Court with having
created uncertainty by its decisions in Burns and HowardJohnson and asserted that his bill
would "give guidance to the Supreme Court in a much clouded area of labor law." He stated
that:
[(Instead of stability, the product of the Supreme Court's series of decisions during the
past four years is uncertainty. Business planners and unions have been left without clear
guidelines to facilitate smooth business transfers. . ..
The Supreme Court's rule produces uncertainty because it replaced contract law
principles with a labor law rule of its own creation, which is that the only obligation
which may lawfully be imposed upon the new employer is the duty to bargain. This
means that a stable bargaining relationship based on contract is automatically replaced
by negotiations which, if unsuccessful, can lead to industrial strife.
23 DAILY LAB. REPs. A-4 (Feb. 2, 1977).
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would be fully aware of their respective rights and responsibilities
throughout the remaining period of the contract. 9 Such predictability would facilitate smooth business transfers; successor employers
would have a reasonable basis upon which to estimate labor costs,
Congress already has established a successorship doctrine for service contracts entered
into by the federal government. In 1972 the Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 353(c) (1970),
was amended to require successor employers, when there is substantial continuity in the
services to be provided, to pay service employees the same wages and fringe benefits that the
predecessor contractor's collective bargaining agreement provided. The Service Contract Act
now also requires successors to pay future wage and benefit increases contained in the predecessor's contract.
California has passed a statute requiring a successor employer to honor the terms of his
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. The statute states in part:
(a) Where a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor organization contains a successor clause such clause shall be binding upon and enforceable
against any successor employer who succeeds to the contracting employer's business
until the expiration date of the agreement stated in the agreement. No such successor
clause shall be binding upon or enforceable against any successor employer for more than
three years from the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the
contracting employer and the labor organization.
(b) As used in this section "successor employer" means any purchaser, assignee, or
transferee of a business the employees of which are subject to a collective bargaining
agreement, if such purchaser, assignee, or transferee conducts or will conduct substantially the same business operation, or offer the same service, and use the same physical
facilities, as the contracting employer.
(d) An employer who is a party to a collective bargaining agreement containing a
successor clause has the affirmative duty to disclose the existence of such agreement and
such clause to any successor employer. Such disclosure requirement shall be satisfied
by including in any contract of such sale, agreement to purchase, or any similar instrument of conveyance a statement that the successor employer is bound by such successor
clause as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1127(a), (b), (d) (West Supp. 1977).
99. Doppelt, supra note 4, at 184-85. One commentator has suggested that "a theory of
contract continuity would create an industrial atmosphere of constant confrontation-the
union seeking to bind the new employer and the successor in turn arguing that specific terms
and conditions were unreasonable, inequitable or impossible of performance." The Impact
of John Wiley Revisited, supra note 27, at 892 n.121. The Wiley rule admittedly leaves for
the arbitrator the question of the successor's obligation under the contract's substantive
terms. Thus numerous grievances could be filed in which the union and the successor constantly dispute the successor's obligations under the contract. Such a multiplicity of disputes
is highly unlikely. Once arbitration is ordered by a court, a union, desiring a quick and
efficient resolution of all of its claims in order to achieve a stable working environment and
to minimize the costs of arbitration which it must share, would bring all its claims against
the successor in one arbitration proceeding. Furthermore, even if continuous confrontations
through arbitration occurred, they would not be the same kinds of confrontations that occur
at the bargaining table. First, economic warfare would be highly unlikely; employees would
remain at their jobs and industrial stability would continue through the arbitration process.
Second, a confrontation through arbitration would not be as extensive or intense as the
confrontation that occurs during bargaining negotiations because the basic contract terms
already would have been established and the parties would have agreed to abide by the
arbitrator's decision.
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thereby reducing the likelihood of financial decline or failure of the
employer-the severest form of instability and unrest. 0 In addition,
the new employer would be protected from an attempt by his employees and their union to take advantage of a change in employer
to escape their obligations under the existing contract.' 0 '
Furthermore, the certainty that a successor would be required
to arbitrate with the union his additional future obligations under
the predecessor's contract might encourage a prospective purchaser,
dissatisfied with that contract, to meet with union representatives
and discuss both his interests and the needs of employees. 0 - The
holding of such meetings prior to the actual change in employers
would foster the goals of freedom of choice and industrial stability.
If a new labor agreement were reached at such meetings, then both
parties would have agreed freely upon the contract terms. If a new
agreement were not reached, the employees still would be covered
by the contract for which they freely bargained with the predecessor, and the potential new employer with full knowledge of the
existing contract could choose either to withdraw from or to con03
tinue with the business transaction.
The advantages of arbitration alone argue for imposing this
duty on the successor employer." 4 Arbitration "promotes industrial
harmony through a fair, fast and flexible system utilizing neutral
100. This argument was asserted by the successor employer in Bath Iron Works Corp.
v. Bath Marine Draftsmen's Ass'n, 393 F.2d 407, 410 (1st Cir. 1968). In that case, the successor wanted to assume the predecessor's labor contract, but the Union representing the predecessor's employees wanted the successor to arbitrate its obligations under the successor's
labor contract. The court allowed the Union to compel arbitration under the successor's
contract.
101. See 21 U. KAN. L. REv. 97, 103 (1972).
102. See The Duties of Successor Employers, supra note 27, at 502.
103. One commentator has argued against requiring the successor to arbitrate his obligations under the predecessor's labor agreement, stating that "[cirippling restraints placed
upon employer and union alike through imposition of the predecessor's contract will serve to
retard industrial peace more surely than the stability inherent in contract survival will tend
to promote it." 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 193, 206-07 (1972). This argument has two
basic faults. First, any employer who is aware that he will be bound by the predecessor's
contract, and who considers that contract to be "crippling" will not proceed with acquisition
of the enterprise. Second, because the union initially agreed to the contract terms and the
business has remained substantially the same, the assertion that the contract will impose
"crippling restraints" on either the employer or the union has no basis.
104. For cases enunciating the numerous attributes of arbitration as a means of achieving industrial peace and avoiding economic warfare, see Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Drake Bakeries, Inc. v.
Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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but knowledgeable 'peace-makers.' 105 The arbitrator, by virtue of
his expertise and attitude, is better qualified than the courts to
understand the effects of a change of employer on the working environment and of a potential loss of contractual rights on the employees and thus is more likely to arrive at an equitable, workable resolution of the union's grievances against the successor. ' Furthermore, the speed of arbitration often works as a catalyst in effecting
labor peace, since it quickly creates certainty in the employment
relationship while keeping the employees on the job. 10
In addition, imposition of a duty to arbitrate under the predecessor's contract promotes the employees' free choice and preserves
industrial stability by protecting the existing collective bargaining
relationship. Federal labor policy and the NLRA provide a number
of protections for legally established collective bargaining relationships.' 8 Requiring the successor employer to arbitrate under and
possibly to abide by the terms of the predecessor's contract also
serves to protect the bargaining relationship in successor situations.
An employer's unilateral termination of a collective bargaining
agreement would foster grave doubts in the minds of employees
about the strength and vitality of their union. The employer's action
"dilutes membership confidence in the union's ability to negotiate"
and causes employees to withhold their full support from the
union.' 9 These considerations combine to undermine the union's
effectiveness in subsequent negotiations, for the union would become less able to persuade employees to support a strike or the use
of some other economic weapon. The union would be further weakened by the additional expenditure of time, effort, and money necessary for renegotiating and possibly striking in an attempt to reach
a new bargain. "Requiring this continual effort would likely exhaust
the strength of many unions and consequently would interfere both
with the employees' initial choice of bargaining representative and
105. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Howmet Corp., 466 F.2d at 1253; See also
Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1975); Slicker, supra note 2,
at 1075-76.
106. Peerless Pressed Metal Corp. v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 451
F.2d 19, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1971). See also Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Nolde
Bros., 530 F.2d 548, 551-53 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
107. United Steelworkers v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147, 153 n.11
(5th Cir. 1964); Note, Recent Developments in Labor Law Successorship,26 SYRAcusE L. REv.
798, 810 (1975).
108. For a discussion of various protections of the collective bargaining relationship,
including "certification bar" and "contract bar," see Goldberg, supra note 4, at 789-91.
109. 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 193, 206-07 (1972); 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 978, 990
(1973).
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with industrial stability"" 0 by undermining the existing collective
bargaining relationship.
In a more general sense, if employees lose the rights secured for
them in a labor agreement every time a change in employers occurs,
the collective bargaining process and the contract resulting from it
diminish in importance. The unanticipated termination of their
contract can give rise to employee skepticism about the utility of
bargaining or participating in a strike to achieve satisfactory contract terms.' Without the imposition of the predecessor's contract
on the successor, employees might interpret their NLRA rights as
insignificant and might decline to exercise those rights.' 2 As one
commentator has stated: "[Unless collective bargaining agreement rights are given protection through a body of remedial law that
increases the certainty that these rights will be enforcable, parties
will not be encouraged to enter collective bargaining agreements.
This frustrates the purpose of § 301.113 On the other hand, imposing
the terms of a predecessor's contract on a successor encourages employees to engage in collective bargaining because it assures them
that their contract rights will survive at least until the expiration
date.'
Impinging upon Free Collective Bargaining
Perhaps the strongest argument-at least in the Supreme
Court's mind-for not imposing upon a successor the duty to arbitrate the terms of a predecessor's contract is the effect that such a
duty might have on free collective bargaining. The Supreme Court
in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB115 reaffirmed the policy against governmental interference in the free collective bargaining process as basic
to national labor law. Deep concern with the dangers of governmentally imposed collective bargaining agreements motivated
Congress to amend the NLRA to include section 8(d),11 1 which
expressly prohibits the forcing of contract terms upon unconsenting
(2)

110. Slicker, supra note 2, at 1052; Effect on Successor Employer, supra note 96, at 252
n.35.
111. Doppelt, supra note 4, at 184-85.
112. Barksdale, Successor Liability Under the National Labor Relations Act and Title
I, 54 TEx. L. REv. 707, 716 (1976); 88 HARv. L. REv. 759, 767 (1975). See also Golden State
Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 185 (1973) (dealing with successor's duty to remedy
predecessor's unfair labor practices).
113. Doppelt, supra note 4, at 176-78.
114. Stern, supra note 79, at 19.
115. 397 U.S. 99 (1970); see note 45 supra for the facts of the case.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970); see note 46 supra for the text of § 8(d).
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parties." 7 The vice of governmental intervention in free collective
bargaining is twofold. First, in as diverse an economy as exists today, governmental bodies, such as the NLRB or the courts, are incapable of determining what contract terms will accommodate the
needs and interests of the employer and employees at a particular
job location. The employer and employees are the parties most
knowledgeable about the working environment and thus are best
qualified to decide upon contract terms that are fair, manageable,
and specifically designed to suit the particular job situation.
Second, governmental intervention necessarily tips the balance
of economic bargaining power in favor of one of the bargaining parties. Under the theory of free collective bargaining, the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement should reflect the relative economic
strengths of the negotiating parties, with the government assuming
only the role of neutral enforcer of the contract. Whenever the government imposes a contract term on the parties, it does so irrespective of their economic strengths, thereby creating a contractual term
that one or the other of the parties was unable to attain through
negotiation.
Contrary to the view of the Court in Burns, however, neither of
these vices inheres in a rule that imposes a predecessor's labor
agreement on the successor employer. In a successor situation, the
existing labor contract has been freely negotiated by the union and
the predecessor employer. Therefore, the contract reflects the judgment of the parties directly involved in the employment relationship concerning which terms best will meet their needs. The government has had no part in the writing of any of the terms of that
agreement. The government is merely determining that, in light of
the "substantial continuity of the business enterprise," the predecessor's contract still will best satisfy the parties' needs and should
be binding on the new employment relationship."' Furthermore, by
imposing the predecessor's contract on the successor employer, the
117. A House report commented:
Notwithstanding this language of the Court, the present Board has gone very far, in the
guise of determining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting
itself up as the judge of what concessions an employer must make and of the proposals
and counterproposals that he may or may not make. . . . Unless Congress writes into
the law guides for the Board to follow, the Board may attempt to carry this process still
further and seek to control more and more the terms of collective-bargaining agreements.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1947).
118. The court in NLRB v. Interstate 65 Corp., 453 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1971), in finding
a "substantial continuity in the business enterprise" also found "no meaningful, perceptible
effect on the employer-employee relationship." Id. at 273. The government's imposition of
the predecessor's contract thus is not an outside imposition of contract terms, but rather is a
continuation of bargained-for terms. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 746.
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government is not aligning itself with either the employer or the
employees. The government simply is taking the original contract,
written by the original parties, and is imposing it on the new parties
regardless of which party benefits from the contract's terms or desires to terminate it.
The Wiley rule requiring a successor to arbitrate under and to
be bound by the predecessor's contract to the extent an arbitrator
finds necessary is a minimal interference with the normal freedom
of the parties to establish the terms and conditions of employment
through collective bargaining. As previously discussed, the employer's interests are well protected by the "substantial continuity"
test. Satisfaction of that test assures that the terms of that contract
still will be reasonable in the new employment context and will not
impose any undue burdens on the successor employer. Furthermore,
the predecessor's contract could be imposed on the successor only
for the unexpired period of that contract. The great majority of
collective bargaining agreements extend for a term of less than three
years," ' and the successor is just as likely to assume the new business in the latter half of that term as in the earlier half. Therefore,
the imposition of the predecessor's contract and the resulting interference with collective bargaining probably would be of limited duration.
The successor can avoid even the limited interference with
collective bargaining created by Wiley since several "free bargaining" options are available to him prior to arbitration. The successor
can negotiate with the predecessor so that the terms of the merger
or purchase of assets financially compensate him for assuming the
labor agreement.'2 0 Additionally, nothing in the national labor law
prevents the prospective successor from negotiating contract alterations with the union prior to the completion of the sale or merger,
without the threats of economic or legal sanctions.'21 If the potential
119.

or less. 2

As of 1965, 95% of all collective bargaining contracts were for a term of three years
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS

36:1 (1965).

120. The NLRB in Burns stated:
[W]e perceive no real inequity in requiring a "successor employer" to take over his
predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement, for he stands in the shoes of his predecessor. He can make whatever adjustments the acceptance of such obligation may dictate
in his negotiations concerning the take over of the business.
182 N.L.R.B. at 350. See also Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), enforced sub. nom.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968); Doppelt, supra
note 4, at 185; Vernon, supra note 26, at 1205; 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1202, 1205 (1967).
121. One commentator has proposed that § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA be amended so that
the "duty to bargain" would require a potential successor to discuss with the union the
application and survival of various provisions of the labor agreement once purchasing negotia-
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new employer and the union fail to agree on satisfactory terms, the
successor can refuse to complete the business transaction. With
these options available to the successor, the imposition of the predecessor's labor contract on him is not inequitable nor unduly restric2
tive of his right to free collective bargaining.' 1
tions with the predecessor had begun. Following these negotiations, the potential successor
could either consummate the sale or merger or terminate the transaction. If the prospective
employer proceeded with the sale or merger, he then would be required to arbitrate any
unresolved claims under the predecessor's contract. The Impact of John Wiley Revisited,
supra note 27, at 892-94.
122. See Goldberg, supra note 4, at 776-77; Laner, A Buyer Views the Purchase of a
Unionized Business, 47 Cmu. B. REC. 93, 100 n.17 (1965).
Although the duty to arbitrate and possibly to honor other provisions of the predecessor's
contract would be imposed on the successor, the duty would not require the successor to hire
any of the predecessor's former employees. As the court in Burns stated:
The Board has never held that the National Labor Relations Act itself requires that an
employer who submits the winning bid for a service contract or who purchases the assets
of a business be obligated to hire all of the employees of the predecessor though it is
possible that such an obligation might be assumed by the employer.
406 U.S. at 280 n.5. Before the Burns decision, some asserted that a rule imposing the
predecessor's contract on the successor would require the successor to hire all of the predecessor's employees. The reasoning was that, if the contract survived, the contract provisions
prohibiting lay-offs and discharges without "just cause" necessarily would survive also.
Therefore, the successor could not refuse to hire any of the predecessor's employees unless
he had "just cause" for doing so. See K.B. & J. Young's Super Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 377
F.2d 463, 465 (9th Cir. 1967); Doppelt, supra note 4, at 186-87; Morris & Gaus, supra note 5,
at 1370. The fallacy in this argument lies in its failure to recognize that the predecessor
discharges his employees for "just cause," and the successor merely hires them anew. Furthermore, when the predecessor's contract is imposed on the successor it applies only to employees
hired by the successor and does not apply until they are hired. This point was reiterated in
Howard Johnson when the Court declared that "employees of the terminating employer
have no legal right to continued employment with the new employer." 417 U.S. at 264. See
also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. at 184 n.6; Bartenders Local 340 v.
Howard Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1976); Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523
F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1975); Tri State Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 171, 173
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Lone Star Steel Co., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1977).
Several commentators have argued that the successor's right to choose his work force
unilaterally, combined with the requirement of "substantial continuity in the work force,"
provides the successor with a means of manipulating the successorship rule to avoid obligations under the contract and to frustrate the employees' expectations. As one author succinctly stated, the Court in Howard Johnson was confronted with "the crucial successorship
question of whether a purchasing company may for valid economic non-discriminatory reasons refuse to hire a predecessor's employees and whether by such action he may avoid the
'successor' label and the labor obligations flowing therefrom." The Howard Johnson Court
answered this critical question in the affirmative. Spelfogel, A CorporateSuccessor's Obligation to Honor His Predecessor'sLabor Contract: The HowardJohnson Case, 25 LAB. L.J. 298,
300 (1974). See also ContractualSuccessorship,supranote 84, at 628; 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
510, 523 (1975). This argument is premised on the belief that, because a successor will not
be bound by any of the provisions of the predecessor's labor agreement unless he hires a
sufficient number of the predecessor's former employees, the successor will therefore fail to
hire those employees. Although this is theoretically possible, it is not practical for several
reasons. The new employer could not refuse to hire the predecessor's employees solely on the
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Practical Results of Wiley

As pointed out by the court in United Steelworkers v. United
States Gypsum Co., ' 3 "Wiley has undoubtedly had a significant
impact on the labor relations policies of both union and management officials in cases presenting successorship problems." ' 4 A
wholly unanticipated result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Wiley is that, of the nine cases in which a federal court has ordered
the successor employer to arbitrate claims based on the predecessor's contract, 25 only two actually have resulted in arbitration proceedings.'25 In the other seven cases, the union's grievances were
resolved through collective bargaining between the union and the
successor employer. 121 Two possible explanations exist for this phenomenon. The first possibility is that, in view of the court's arbitration order and its accompanying implication that the entire contract
might be binding on him, the successor has expressed a willingness
to accede to the union's claims or, at least, to agree to a comprobasis of their union membership. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. at 280 n.5;
International Ass'n of Machinists Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414 F.2d at 1138; Tri State
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 171, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Therefore, if the successor
employer refused to hire union members in an attempt to evade the imposition of the labor
agreement, he would have committed an unfair labor practice under NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). The successor must have a valid business reason for refusing to
hire the former employees. Quite often, however, legitimate business reasons produce the
opposite result and prompt the successor actively to recruit the predecessor's former employees. Frequently, they are the only available labor source in a particular locality, but more
often, they are the only personnel with sufficient skill, training, and experience to operate
the business smoothly and efficiently immediately after the successor takes over. Since pragmatic reasons will motivate the successor to hire the predecessor's employees, allowing the
successor complete freedom in selecting his work complement accomplishes both the goals of
minimizing government intervention and protecting employee rights. Accordingly, the likelihood that a successor will hire his predecessor's employees, despite his freedom not to, weighs
heavily in favor of imposing the predecessor's labor agreement on the successor.
123. 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1974).
124. Id. at 725.
125. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); United States Gypsum
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967); Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston,
377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1967); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d
Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. Plant Guard Workers Local 151, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964);
Retail Clerks Local 1552 v. Lynn Drug Co., 299 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D. Ohio 1969); Local Joint
Executive Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Joden, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 390 (D. Mass.
1966); International Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers v. Great Northwest Fibre
Co., 263 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Wash. 1965); Mates & Pilots v. American Oceanic Corp., 67
L.R.R.M. 2951 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
126. United States Gypsum Co., 56 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 363 (1971) (Valtin, Arb.);
Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 210 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.).
127. This result was revealed by Professor Goldberg's correspondence with the counsel
for the parties in each of those cases. See Goldberg, supra note 4, at 764 n.45. See also Slicker,
supra note 2, at 1085-86.
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mise favoring the union. 28' The alternative explanation is that the
parties, uncertain of the possible arbitration award, have preferred
to resolve their own conflicts rather than to entrust such an impor29
tant decision to an uninvolved third party.
Regardless of the motivation, the rule established in Wiley is
resulting in promotion of, rather than interference with, collective
bargaining. Wiley is altering only the potential consequences of unsuccessful collective bargaining in successorship situations. If parties who voluntarily enter into collective bargaining after having
been ordered to arbitrate under the predecessor's contract are unable to reach a satisfactory agreement, they still are bound by the
arbitration order. Consequently, their disputes will be settled by the
arbitrator without any resort to economic weapons. In direct contrast, parties whose negotiations are unrestricted by any of the provisions of the predecessor's contract, 3 ' such as in Burns, and who
fail to agree on contract terms are more likely to resort to strikes and
other forms of economic warfare to resolve their differences.
These practical results of Wiley strongly support a rule requiring the successor to arbitrate his potential obligations under the
predecessor's contract. They not only undercut the criticism that
Wiley would inhibit free collective bargaining, but quite to the contrary demonstrate that Wiley is encouraging both collective bargaining and the avoidance of industrial strife. 3 '
128. This alternative has been disputed by one commentator who states that it "seems
unlikely in view of the time, effort and expense involved in procuring the court's decision."
Slicker, supra note 2, at 1085.
129. Id. at 1086. A union presumably would be willing to bargain in this situation
because the arbitration order would add to its bargaining power. Furthermore, the union
would have nothing to lose because it would merely proceed with arbitration if bargaining
was unsuccessful. See text accompanying note 130 infra.
130. In this situation not only is the arbitration clause not binding on the parties, but
neither is any express or implied no-strike clause.
131. Furthermore, the paucity of federal court decisions ordering arbitration suggests
that the majority of unions and successor employers are settling their disputes among themselves without resorting to the courts. In the twelve years after the Wiley decision, from 1964
to 1976, only approximately forty federal cases have dealt with the issue of a successor
employer's future obligations under his predecessor's labor contract. In a large number of
successorship situations, the successor employer as a matter of course has assumed the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See Wal-Lite Div. of United States Gypsum Co. v.
NLRB, 484 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1973); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1972); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Howmet Corp., 466
F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1972); Metropolitan Terrazzo Co., 60 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 345 (1973)
(McGury, Arb.); National Heat & Power Co., 73-1 Lab. Arb. Awards 8225 (1973) (Turkus,
Arb.); Elesco Smelting Corp., 56 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1256 (1971) (Sembower, Arb.);
Federal Elec. Corp., 70-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 8590 (1970) (Updegraff, Arb.). In numerous
other instances, the successor, although not assuming the contract, has voluntarily agreed to
binding arbitration of his obligations under it. See B&B Foods, Inc., 1975 Lab. Arb. Awards
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Effect of Burns on the Wiley Holding

Resolution of the questions whether a court in the future may
order a successor to arbitrate under his predecessor's contract and
whether an arbitrator may find the successor bound by that contract
depends largely on an analysis of the effects of the Burns decision
on the holding in Wiley.
(1) Distinguishing Burns from Wiley
Several commentators have argued that it is possible to distinguish Burns from Wiley on its facts and to conclude that each represents the current state of the law for its particular fact situation.'
Indeed, each federal court that has addressed the question of
Wiley's continued viability has distinguished the two cases and has
stated that a court may order a successor to arbitrate under his
predecessor's labor contract and that an arbitrator may bind the
successor to other substantive contract terms.'33 In reaching these
8141 (Keefe, Arb.); Houston Beverage Co., 72-1 Lab. Arb. Awards 8232 (1972) (Post,
Arb.); Wamco, Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1220 (1971) (Roper, Arb.); Shippers Truck
Serv., Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1041 (1971) (Williams, Arb.); Kent Enterprises, Inc.,
55 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 777 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.).
Another explanation for these results is that predecessor employers frequently have required as one of the terms of the merger or sale of assets the successor employer to honor the
existing labor agreement. Such action by the predecessor usually is prompted by the existence
of a "successors and assigns" clause in his contract with the union. Under this type of clause,
the predecessor could be liable to the union for damages if he transferred his business assets
without insuring that the successor would assume the contract.
132. See Morris & Gaus, supra note 5, at 1360-67; Contractual Successorship, supra
note 84, at 618-19; Note, ContractRights and the SuccessorEmployer: The Impact of Burns
Security, 71 MICH. L. REv. 571, 586 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Impact of Burns
Security]; 48 NoTRE DAME LAW. 978, 980 (1973).
In contrast to this view, one commentator has suggested that "[b]y reading Wiley and
Burns together and giving vitality to each, the conclusion seems inescapable that the substantive terms of the contract survive, whether by decision of the arbitrator or the NLRB, only if
the successor in word or deed manifests an intent to be bound thereby," thus implying that
after Burns courts still could order a successor to arbitrate his obligations under the predecessor's contract, but the arbitrator could impose the terms of that contract only by looking to
the successor's intent. Slicker, supra note 2, at 1102. Another author has stated:
Burns holds that the agreement does not survive a change in ownership absent assumption in fact or in law by the successor, but without a bargaining agreement, what is left
to arbitrate? Wiley now presents the paradoxical situation of a duty arising from the
prior agreement, although the prior agreement does not survive. Burns thus limits the
situations in which arbitration is even a possibility. ...
Thus this commentator suggests that arbitration may be ordered only when the successor has
assumed the labor contract. Note, Labor Law-The Obligationsof a Successor Employer, 51
N.C.L. REv. 337, 343 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Obligationsof a Successor Employer].
133. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Nolde Bros., 530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir.
1975); Boeing Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 504 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g 351
F. Supp. 813 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956
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conclusions, various circuit courts have noted that "[a]s the Supreme Court emphasized, however, the decision in that case
[Burns] was an exceedingly narrow one. The pronouncements laid
down in Burns, therefore, can hardly be read to settle every successorship problem that may arise. 1 ' 34 Another circuit court has
pointed out that "[although the potential implications of the
Wiley case have since been narrowed . . . the Court has not retreated from its recognition that in some instances the national
labor policy can impose an arbitration duty upon the unconsenting
35
party.",
The Burns Court, subsequent lower courts, and commentators
have emphasized three bases on which Wiley and Burns are distinguishable. The first and most persuasive difference is that Wiley
involved a section 301 suit to compel arbitration, whereas Burns
arose in the context of an unfair labor practice proceeding in which
the Board was expressly limited by the provisions of section 8(d).
Relying on this distinction, several authorities have argued that
Burns should be interpreted as a limitation on the Board's authority
to provide contractual remedies in a successor situation, rather than
as a statement of substantive policies contrary to those established
in Wiley. 3 This interpretation draws support from several considerations. First, the Burns holding rested primarily upon a finding that
the Board did not have the power to impose the predecessor's contract on the successor. The Supreme Court's phrasing of the question at issue-"whether the National Labor Relations Board could
order Burns to observe the terms of a collective bargaining contract
signed by the union and Wackenhut that Burns had not voluntarily
assumed"' 37 -demonstrates the centrality of the Court's concern
with the scope of the Board's powers. In finding that the Board did
not have this authority, the Court emphasized that the Board is
bound by the provisions of the NLRA and that the section 8(d)
prohibition against compelling agreement on substantive terms also
(3d Cir. 1974); United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.
1974); Textile Workers v. Cast Optics Corp., 464 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1972).
134. Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d at 959.
135. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Nolde Bros., 530 F.2d at 551.
136. See Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d at 961; United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d at 725-26; Morris & Gaus, supra note 5, at
1360; ContractualSuccessorship, supra note 84, at 618; Note, Labor Law-Effect on Successor Employer of Predecessor's Collective BargainingAgreement, 86 HAv. L. REv. 247, 256
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Effect on Successor Employer].
137. 406 U.S. at 274. Similarly, the circuit court in Burns had held that "in ordering
Burns to honor the contract executed by Wackenhut, the Board has exceeded its powers."
441 F.2d at 915.
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restricts the Board's
ability to impose the predecessor's contract on
38
the successor.1
The distinction thus is based upon the fact that section 8(d)
limits the powers of the Board; it does not limit the powers of federal
courts or of arbitrators. 3 9 Since national labor policy greatly favors
arbitration as a means of settling disputes, the courts are empowered and encouraged to require successors to arbitrate under predecessor's labor contracts. After a court has ordered arbitration, the
arbitrator derives his power to impose the predecessor's contract
terms on the successor from the contract itself and is not restricted
by the NLRA. Finally, several policy reasons have been suggested
as justifications for prohibiting the Board from ordering arbitration,
while permitting the courts to do so. Relying on the general policy
against Board administration of contracts,10 the NLRB in its Burns
decision adopted an all-or-nothing approach to the successor's duties under his predecessor's contract. If the employer was found to
be a successor, he was bound to honor the entire contract. If he was
not, he had no obligations under the contract."' As the Court noted
138. In arriving at this interpretation of § 8(d), the Court relied heavily on H.K. Porter
Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). "Porter axiomatically finds the broad remedial powers of
the Board are limited by and cannot transcend the policy or the express statutory provisions
of the NLRA." Stern, supra note 79, at 25; see Bakaly & Bryan, supra note 5, at 120-21;
Flaherty & Vartain, 1973-1974 Annual Survey of LaborRelations Law, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REv. 1105, 1163 (1974).
A further indication that the finding of a limit on the powers of the Board was essential
to the Burns holding is contained in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
In Golden State the Court upheld a Board order requiring a successor employer to remedy
the unfair labor practices of its predecessor. The Court distinguished Burns on the grounds
that in Golden State no statutory policies prohibited the imposition of a remedial, but
noncontractual, obligation on the successor. Id. at 183-85. See also Flaherty & Vartain, supra,
at 1161-62; United Steelworkers v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d at 152; Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d at 576-78.
139. A district court in the Fifth Circuit has observed: "Yet, acting under the same act
of Congress that authorizes courts to compel such arbitration, the NLRB 'is without power
to compel a company or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision of a
collective-bargaining agreement.'" United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 339
F. Supp. 302, 305 (N.D. Ala. 1972), rev'd in part on other grounds, 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.
1974). See also Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc. 493 F.2d at 961; Swerdlow, supra
note 79, at 15.
140. Effect on Successor Employer, supra note 136, at 256 n.6. "The Supreme Court,
in my opinion, should properly keep the NLRB out of the business of adjudicating individual
contract claims under collective bargaining agreements, consigning them to the courts or
arbitrators." St. Antoine, Judicial Cautionand the Supreme Court'sLabor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 269, 272 (1973).
141. "Apparently the Board felt that it was barred from taking a middle ground by
requiring the successor to honor selective portions of the agreement . . . ." Detroit Local
Joint Executive Bd. v. Howard Johnson Co., 482 F.2d 489, 496 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 249 (1974). See also Morris & Gaus, supra note 5, at 1380; The Impact of
Burns Security, supra note 132, at 586.
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in Burns, such an approach would lead to rigidity in labor relations
because the Board would be establishing general rules applicable in
all successor situations and binding to some degree as precedent.4 2
Arbitration, on the other hand, fosters flexibility in contract
administration. The arbitrator can examine fact situations in detail
and may consider changed circumstances and unforeseen factors.4 3
Also, the arbitrator may fashion a remedy that modifies or eliminates portions of the predecessor's contract that are inequitable or
unreasonable in view of the change in employer. 44 Furthermore, the
arbitrator has special skill and experience in contract interpretation
and is quite familiar with employment conditions and the law of the
shop. " ' Therefore, the argument concludes, the imposition of substantive contract terms on the successor is a function that is better
satisfied by an arbitrator than by the NLRB.
The argument that the Burns decision merely represents a limitation on the power of the NLRB encounters several difficulties.
Burns's emphasis on free collective bargaining and voluntary agreement as the proper means for establishing the terms and conditions
of employment cannot be ignored. That case's freedom of contract
rationale justifies denying the power to require nonconsenting successors to arbitrate to both the courts and the Board, for the Burns
Court condemned not only the Board's imposition of the predecessor's contract, but also any "variety of official compulsion over the
actual terms of the contract." ' Moreover, nothing in section 301 or
142. 406 U.S. at 288. The circuit court in Howard Johnson stated that "[a]s noted by
the Supreme Court in Burns the Board's position would lead to rigidity in labor relations.
This factor we feel is primarily the Supreme Court's reason for rejection of the Board's
position. In arbitration proceedings as ordered below such rigidity is not present." 482 F.2d
at 496. See also The Impact of Burns Security, supra note 132, at 586.
143. See Abodeely, supra note 4, at 523. See also text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
144. See Effect on Successor Employer, supranote 136, at 256. See also text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 104-07 supra.
146. Contractual Successorship, supra note 84, at 618-19, 625. One commentator has
stated that:
equally unpersuasive is the Court's legalistic assertion that § 8(d) does not apply to
arbitration. That conclusion may be analytically correct for § 8(d) purports only to
define the scope of good faith bargaining and not to reach the content of particular
provisions within the contract. If it means anything at all, however, the policy of § 8(d)
favors the consensual meeting of the minds of the parties. It substitutes arms-length
bargaining and voluntary agreement for industrial strife or officially imposed terms and
conditions of employment dictated from an agency outside the employment relationship. . . .In its wisdom Congress opted for a regulatory scheme requiring collective
bargaining, but compelling no particular content to the contract reached. At the heart
of this scheme of collective bargaining is grievance arbitration, which the Court envisions
as the ultimate embodiment of the continuing collective bargaining process. Therefore
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in the legislative history of section 8(d) indicates that courts should
be permitted to impose contract obligations in circumstances in
which the Board is prohibited from interfering with the freedom of
contract. Although the federal courts are empowered to develop the
law of labor contract enforcement, they must do so in compliance
1 7
with the principles of the NLRA and express statutory mandates. 1
If the application of section 8(d) is appropriate in successorship
cases, then federal courts apparently are bound by that provision's
express policy against imposing contract terms upon an unconsenting party. Thus the federal courts may not impose the predecessor's
arbitration clause on the successor.
Another weakness in the argument that Burns merely represents a limitation of the Board's power lies in the fact that imposition by the Board of a predecessor's contract on a successor would
not lead to rigidity and inflexibility. Quite to the contrary, such
imposition would leave the ultimate resolution of the contract's
applicability and meaning in the hands of an arbitrator. When the
Board orders the imposition of the predecessor's contract, it enforces
that contract "in gross." In so doing, the Board has not made any
decision on the proper interpretation of the contract or on the applicability of certain contract terms and has not ordered specific
performance. "' The Board has determined merely that the new
employer is a successor who cannot repudiate the predecessor's
entire contract.' All potential disputes over the applicability or
interpretation of particular contract clauses are left to the arbitrator
for resolution. The Board, therefore, would not be doing any more
than Wiley did by implication.
to hold that the statutory limitation of § 8(d) is inapplicable to arbitration is to permit
indirectly what the Congress prohibits directly.
Slicker, supra note 2, at 1099.
147. Lodge 743, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 337 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.
1964). See also Note, The Impact of HowardJohnson on the Labor Obligationsof the Successor Employer, 74 MICH. L. REv. 555, 570 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Impact of Howard
Johnson].
148. It will be argued later that § 8(d) is inapplicable to successorship situations. See
text accompanying notes 168-75 infra.
149. The employer who declines to honor its predecessor's contract normally does
not rely on arguments of contract interpretation, but simply on the proposition that it
is not a successor and, hence, need not recognize the incumbent union or honor its
contract, whatever the intent of the contracting parties. For the Board to order the
employer to abide by the contract as well as recognize the union would thus involve no
problems of contract interpretation.
Goldberg, supra note 4, at 812.
150. Id.
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The Burns Court provided a second basis upon which to distinguish Burns and Wiley. The Court noted that Wiley involved only
an order requiring the successor to arbitrate, which rested, in large
part, upon the national labor policy favoring arbitration. Burns, on
the other hand, involved a Board order requiring the successor to
honor all of the contract's substantive provisions.' 5 ' Several authorities have urged that the Court was implying that the principles and
policy considerations applicable to unfair labor practice proceedings
differ from those relevant to section 301 suits to compel arbitration.'52 In unfair labor practice proceedings involving section 8(d),
the Court absolutely has prohibited any interference with freedom
of contract, even if occasional industrial strife must be tolerated to
protect that freedom. In section 301 cases, however, the importance
of freedom of contract is diminished, and the benefits of arbitration
and the need to protect employees' contract rights are emphasized.
Accordingly, in section 301 proceedings the Court has determined
that arbitration is preferable to industrial strife and thus has permitted this intrusion on freedom of contract. On the basis of this
second distinction between Wiley and Burns, it has been argued
that Wiley, with its reliance on the policy favoring arbitration, still
authorizes the courts to order a successor to arbitrate under his
predecessor's contract.' 3
The suggestion that the different policy considerations that
control section 8(d) and section 301 cases justify different results is
wholly without merit. In the first place, Burns's attempt to distinguish Wiley as a case based solely on the policy in favor of arbitration was inaccurate and
ignore[d] the fact that the Supreme Court in Wiley in effect compelled a
successor to agree to a substantive contractual provision of a contract concerning arbitration. Although the Supreme Court in Wiley emphasized the central
role of arbitration in effectuating national labor policy, the national labor
policy being effectuated in Wiley was stability and industrial peace in an
employing industry, the same policy behind the Board's decision in Burns.'
151. 406 U.S. at 285-86.
152. Because the law of labor contract has a function and development quite
distinct from the law of unfair labor practices the possibility has always existed that for
some pivotal questions the two halves of the LMRA might be treated as separate tracks,
whose paths are not necessarily parallel at every point.
Morris & Gaus, supra note 5, at 1374. See also Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint
Executive Bd., 417 U.S. at 268 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Truck-

ing, Inc. 493 F.2d at 960; United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d at 724;
11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 510, 519 (1975); Successor's Bargaining Obligation Upheld, supra
note 132, at 980.
153. See ContractualSuccessorship, supra note 84, at 627; Impact of HowardJohnson,
supra note 147, at 565; The Obligations of a Successor Employer, supra note 132, at 341.
154. 25 OKLA. L. REv. 132, 136 (1972).
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Even if the distinction had been a valid one, the Court in Howard
Johnson nullified it by stating that the courts in a section 301 suit
cannot disregard the basic policies that control in an unfair labor
practice context. The Court held, therefore, that the policies and
in Burns would be applicable in future
considerations emphasized
155
section 301 suits.

The third basis upon which the Burns Court distinguished
Wiley was that Wiley involved a merger occurring against a background of state law, while Burns involved two competing companies
that had never had any prior dealings with each other.' One implication of this distinction is that the applicable state law in Wiley,
which holds the surviving corporation in a merger situation liable
for the disappearing corporation's obligations, was a basis for requiring the successor to arbitrate his obligations under the predecessor's
contract. This is not a viable basis on which to distinguish Burns
and Wiley, for it has long been established, as the Wiley Court itself
stated, that federal law, not state law, controls in successor situations. 157
155. 417 U.S. at 255-56. One commentator has interpreted this conclusion as implying
that the courts and the Board are not permitted to reach different results on the extent of a
successor's obligations under the predecessor's contract and therefore that both the courts
and the Board are bound by the labor policy against imposing contract terms on unconsenting
parties. Impact of HowardJohnson, supra note 147, at 570.
In Bartenders Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1976), a § 301
suit seeking to impose the substantive provisions of a predecessor's labor contract on the
successor, the Ninth Circuit stated that "the fundamental policies outlined in Burns cannot
be disregarded in a court proceeding under section 301." Id. at 1162. In accordance with the
Burns holding that the Board may not order a successor to abide by the substantive terms of
its predecessor's contract, the Ninth Circuit held that a court may not impose substantive
contract terms upon a nonconsenting successor. The court, however, also upheld "the rule of
Wiley that in some circumstances a duty to arbitrate may be imposed upon a successoremployer [as] an accommodation between the legislative endorsement of freedom of contract
and the judicial preference for peaceful arbitral settlement of labor disputes." Id. at 1163.
The Ninth Circuit further stated that the obligation to arbitrate could be imposed on a
successor because "the superiority of arbitration over administrative and judicial remedies
as a means of furthering the interests in peaceful settlement of disputes . . .justifies a
moderation of the insistence upon strict freedom of contract." Id. at 1164.
The court declined to decide whether the policies of Burns and Wiley irreconcilably
conflict because the union had asked only for the imposition of the predecessor's entire
contract and not for arbitration. Nevertheless, in response to the union's argument that
requiring the successor to arbitrate necessarily presupposes that the predecessor's labor agreement may be binding on the successor, the Ninth Circuit noted that "there is no incisive
response, in purely conceptual terms, to this argument." Id. at 1163.
The Ninth Circuit thus has indicated that it would answer affirmatively the question
whether a court may require a successor to arbitrate under the predecessor's labor contract.
Yet, that court has hesitated and failed to indicate that an arbitrator may find the substantive terms of the predecessor's agreement binding on the successor.
156. 406 U.S. at 286-87.
157. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. at 547-48. See also Textile Workers
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Of greater importance is the Court's focus on the fact that there
was "no merger, no sale of assets, and there were no dealings whatsoever between Wackenhut and Burns" and the Court's holding
that the mere hiring of Wackenhut employees was a "wholly insufficient basis for implying either in fact or in law that Burns had
agreed or must be held to have agreed to honor Wackenhut's collective bargaining contract."'' 8 Several authorities have interpreted
this language to mean that the form by which the change of employer takes place will affect the successor employer's duties under
the predecessor's contract and have suggested that if the Court had
found a transfer of assets or some other direct relationship between
Burns and Wackenhut, then it would have imposed the labor contract on Burns.'5 9 The argument that Burns is limited to a competitive bidding situation or to some similar situation in which no direct
nexus connects the two employers is quite difficult to accept. Wiley
itself and numerous other federal courts consistently have held that
the means by which the succession of employers occurs has no effect
on the successor's obligations under his predecessor's contract.'60
Furthermore, section 8(d), with its limitation on the powers of the
NLRB, is in no way confined to a competitive bidding situation, but
rather is applicable also to a merger, reorganization, or sale of assets. This broad applicability of section 8(d) is evidenced by NLRB
v. Denham'"' and Ranch-Way, Inc. v. NLRB"62 in which the Burns
prohibition against the Board's imposition of the predecessor's contract on the successor has been invoked in more conventional successor situations. A more reasonable reading of the Court's concern
with the absence of a transfer of assets is that the lack of a direct
nexus between Burns and Wackenhut was relevant to the Court's
determination of whether Burns could be deemed to have assumed
his predecessor's contract.' 3
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327,
1329 (9th Cir. 1975); St. Antoine, supra note 140, at 273.
158. 406 U.S. at 287.
159. See Textile Workers v. Cast Optics Corp., 464 F.2d 577 (1972); St. Antoine, supra
note 140, at 273; Impact of Howard Johnson, supra note 147, at 561-65; 41 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 106, 117 (1972); 18 ViLL. L. REV. 126, 134 & 137 (1972); The Impact of Burns Security,
supra note 132, at 578.
160. 376 U.S. at 549; United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (9th
Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. Plant Guard Workers Local 151, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964);
Retail Clerks Local 1552 v. Lynn Drug Co., 299 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
161. 469 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 239 (1973) (sale of

assets).
162. 406 U.S. 940 (1972), vacatingfor furtherconsideration445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971)
(sale of assets).
163. UAW v. Saga Foods, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
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Perhaps courts will rely upon these three distinctions either
individually or as a group in future decisions. None of them, however, is compelling and an analysis that focuses solely on them
would overlook the Burns Court's shift in emphasis and approach.
The Wiley Court displayed a major concern for preserving industrial
peace through arbitration and for protecting the contract rights of
employees. Wiley found these policies so strong that they outweighed the fact that the successor was not a signatory to the collective bargaining agreement. In marked contrast, the predominant
emphasis of the Burns decision was on the voluntary nature of
collective bargaining and the unimpeded transfer of assets. The
Burns Court was willing to advance the policy favoring free collective bargaining even at the expense of industrial peace and stabil"' Therefore,
ity. 64
the assertion that the two decisions can be reconciled and can co-exist as effective statements of the law is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to support."' 5 Wiley's order to arbitrate
necessarily indicated that the successor also could be bound by
other substantive terms of that contract.'66 Burns's refusal to impose
any of the predecessor's contract terms, not even the arbitration
clause, and its firm insistence on the superiority of free collective
bargaining imply that an unconsenting successor employer cannot
be bound by his predecessor's contract under any circumstances.
Thus Burns directly conflicts with Wiley.
(2)

Analysis of the Burns Opinion

The incompatibility of the Burns and Wiley decisions, however,
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Wiley should be
abandoned. Quite to the contrary, the analysis undertaken above'
has established that Wiley's insistence that a successor arbitrate
under the predecessor's contract is preferable on policy grounds to
the Burns requirement that collective bargaining negotiations
commence at the very beginning of the new employment relationship. In addition, a close analysis of the Burns decision will reveal
164. The Howard Johnson opinion is also seen as indicating a change in interest from
protecting employee rights toward protecting the free transfer of capital by virtue of its
emphasis on the employer's right to hire whomever he chooses and its insistance that the
principles of Burns are applicable to § 301 suits to compel arbitration. See 11 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 510, 522 (1975).
165. Several other commentators have concluded that Wiley and Burns probably cannot be reconciled. See Morris & Gaus, supra note 5, at 1385-96; Slicker, supra note 2, at 1102;
ContractualSuccessorship, supra note 84, at 618, 625; The Impact of Burns Security, supra
note 132, at 582.
166. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
167. See text accompanying notes 77-114 supra.
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that its legal bases are unsound and fail to support the Court's
ultimate conclusions.
The Burns Court's decision rested primarily upon the language
of section 8(d) of the LMRA. 1 8 Relying on Porter'sinterpretation of
that language,'6 9 the Court asserted that section 8(d) prevented the
imposition of the predecessor's contract on the successor because of
that section's express limitation on the Board's power to do so,
which embodied a national labor policy absolutely prohibiting any
interference with free collective bargaining.'70 The Court's reliance
on section 8(d) and Porter in a successorship case is completely
misplaced. Section 8(d) was intended to apply to situations in which
the union and the employer are negotiating the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement not yet in existence.' 7 ' Section 8(d) does not
apply to a successor situation because a labor contract already exists. ' The legislative history indicates that section 8(d) was intended to foster the freedom of contract and to "completely insulate
negotiatingparties from directly or indirectly being required to comply with a Board order which compels concession to a substantive
term."'73 It is highly unlikely that Congress ever considered whether
a new employer who voluntarily takes over the operation of a business and hires employees covered by an unexpired contract could be
required to honor the existing contract.'74
Moreover, Porteritself fails to support the Burns Court's interpretation of section 8(d). Although Porter affirmed the national
168. See note 46 supra.
169. See note 45 supra.
170. 406 U.S. at 281-86; see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. MacMillan
Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090 (6th Cir. 1974).
171. Although it did not discuss the applicability of § 8(d), the Wiley Court displayed
an awareness of the distinction between imposing the predecessor's contract on the successor
and requiring parties to agree to substantive contract terms. The Court stated:
This case cannot readily be assimilated to the category of those in which there is no
contract whatever or none which is reasonably related to the party sought to be obligated. There was a contract, and Interscience, Wiley's predecessor, was party to it. We
thus find Wiley's obligation to arbitrate this dispute in the Interscience contract construed in the context of a national labor policy.
376 U.S. at 550-51.
172. See Bakaly & Bryan, supra note 5, at 121; Stern, supra note 79, at 24; 14 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 193, 201-02 (1972).
173. Stern, supra note 79, at 26. The Senate Committee on Education and Labor stated:
The committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that this bill is designed
to compel the making of agreements or to permit governmental supervision of their
terms. It must be stressed that the duty to bargain collectively does not carry with it
the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence of collective bargaining is that
either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made to it are satisfactory.
S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
174. Bakaly & Bryan, supra note 5, at 121.
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labor policy prohibiting any interference with voluntary collective
bargaining, it did so in a refusal-to-bargain case in which no contract existed rather than in a successorship case.' 75 The Supreme
Court's refusal in Porter to permit the Board to force the employer
to agree to a specific provision in a proposed agreement is not a
controlling precedent in Burns because the contract in question
already had been negotiated through free collective bargaining.
Thus Portermerely limited the Board's power to settle bargaining
disputes between negotiating parties by denying it the authority to
impose contract terms on either party and accordingly applies only
in bargaining, and not successor, situations.
The inapplicability of section 8(d) and Porter to the Burns
successorship situation has several implications for the approach
and analysis utilized by the Burns Court. First, it establishes that
the Board and the courts are not statutorily prohibited from requiring a successor to honor portions of its predecessor's labor contract.
Furthermore, this analysis of section 8(d) demonstrates that the
Burns Court was incorrect in asserting that the policy favoring free
collective bargaining is the predominant goal of national labor law
in successor situations. Once it has recognized that the policy favoring free collective bargaining is not superior to all other labor policies and, on occasion, may be infringed upon, the Court could consider the national labor policies relied upon in Wiley and could
devise a remedy that satisfactorily accommodates them. The Burns
Court did not repudiate the principles established in Wiley, but as
has been shown, simply felt that section 8(d) prohibited application
of those principles when an intrusion on free collective bargaining
7
would result. 1
175. See United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d at 729; United
Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 339 F. Supp. 302, 306 (N.D. Ala. 1972); Stern,
supra note 79, at 28; Swerdlow, supra note 79, at 6; Effect on SuccessorEmployer, supra note
136, at 254 n.8; Obligations of a Successor Employer, supra note 132, at 340 n.18; 14 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 193, 198 (1972); 25 OKLA. L. REV. 132, 135. See also Vernon, supra
note 26, at 906. The Board in Burns emphasized the language of § 8(d), which states:
"[Where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract." The NLRB determined that § 8(d) reflected Congress' paramount interest in maintaining industrial peace by requiring adherence to existing collective bargaining agreements.
182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
176. Porteralso cannot be read as a repudiation of the Wiley principles.
Wiley did not purport to authorize outside agencies such as arbitrators, NLRB, or courts
to write a new contract governing relations in an industrial community. Rather it held
that a new entrant to that community can, for policy reasons, be bound to an existing
contract for that community notwithstanding its lack of consent thereto. In H.K. Porter
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The continued viability of the Wiley policies is evidenced by
Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB.'77 In upholding the Board's
exercise of discretion in requiring a successor to remedy the unfair
labor practices of his predecessor, the Golden State Court found
that the Board's order struck an equitable balance among the conflicting legitimate interests of the bona fide successor, the public,
and the affected employee. The Court felt that, at a minimal cost
to the successor, the Board's order best effectuated the national
labor policies of avoiding labor strife, of encouraging the exercise of
the rights guaranteed to employees by section 7 of the NLRA, and
of protecting the victimized employee.178 The Court thereby adopted
the Wiley principles of preserving industrial peace and providing
protection for employees from sudden changes in their employment
relationship. Freed from the misinterpretation of section 8(d) in
Burns, the Court properly could implement these policies in a successorship context.
Additionally, once the policies of section 8(d) correctly are excluded from the analysis, the Burns emphasis on lack of privity
becomes an unpersuasive reason for failing to impose the predecessor's contract on the successor. Burns repeatedly stressed notions of
consent and ultimately held that the successor would be bound by
the predecessor's contract only if he had expressly or impliedly assumed that contract."' This result was based primarily upon the
Court's interpretation of section 8(d) and the belief that it could not
infringe upon the policy favoring voluntary agreement to contract
terms. Since section 8(d) is inapplicable to a successor employer,
the Court's emphasis on consent was not valid.
Furthermore, the Burns Court's emphasis on privity, which reflected a return to common law principles of contract theory, was
an unwarranted departure from prior case law. Wiley had established that a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary
contract and is not controlled by formalistic concepts of contract
and privity.'80 Instead, a collective bargaining agreement constitutes
however the question was writing a new contract, rather than determining who was
bound by an existing one.
United Steelworkers v. United Gypsum Co., 339 F. Supp. at 306.
177. 414 U.S. 168 (1973); see Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d at
961 n.24; UAW v. Saga Foods, Inc., 407 F. Supp. at 1252; Flaherty & Vartain, supra note
138, at 1163; Impact of Howard Johnson, supra note 147, at 568.
178. 414 U.S. at 181-85.
179. 406 U.S. at 281-87; see The Impact of Burns Security, supra note 132, at 582.
180. 376 U.S. at 550.
A collective bargaining contract is not an ordinary contract, both because the bargaining
which produces it is compulsory, not voluntary, and because in many areas, public
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a compact establishing the basic legal framework of the employment relationship, which is to be governed by the policies and statutes of national labor law.'8 ' The duty of a successor to honor a
predecessor's contract, therefore, is not derived from a private contract, from an assumption of obligations, or from a transfer of assets.
Instead, the duty is imposed by operation of law as a consequence
of a change in ownership.', 2 Burns's regression to common-law contract principles is unjustified because a finding of successorship for
the purposes of the NLRA does not require privity between the old
and the new employer,'83 but only a "substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise." The test thus focuses upon the
similarity in the employing industry and not upon the relationship
between the predecessor and successor employers. The cases that
have imposed contractual obligations on the successor regardless of
the form of succession are further evidence that privity between the
employers is immaterial. 8 '
The concept of privity in no way relates to the effectuation of
the basic goals and purposes of the successorship doctrine.'85 The
successorship rule is intended to achieve industrial peace by settling
through peaceful arbitration labor disputes arising from a sudden
shift in employer identity. The courts should attempt to achieve this
goal regardless of whether a direct sale of assets or the transfer of a
service contract from one competitor to another effects the change
of employer. The existence or absence of privity is not relevant to
determining whether imposing the duty to arbitrate under the predecessor's contract will achieve industrial peace. Rather, the important question is whether the conditions that result from the employer succession will generate industrial instability. Tying the duty
policy permeates the bargain itself. In construing a collective bargaining contract, therefore, courts like arbitrators must look "to the law" for help in determining the sense of
the contract.
Ratner, The Emergent Role of District Courts in National Labor Policy, 38 F.R.D. 81, 85
(1966); see United States Gypsum Co., 56 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 363, 387 (1971) (Valtin,
Arb.); Stern, supra note 79, at 34-35; Vernon, supra note 26, at 911.
181. See ContractualSuccessorship,supra note 85, at 620; Note, Obligationsof Successor Employers: Recent Variations on the John Wiley Theme, 2 GA. L. REv. 574, 580 (1968).
182. Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 1969).
183. NLRB v. DIT-MCO Inc., 428 F.2d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 1970); Tom-A-Hawk
Transit, Inc., NLRB, 419 F.2d at 1027-28; Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1229, 1301 (1964);
Walker Bros., 41 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 844, 848 (1963) (Crawford, Arb.).
184. United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968); Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1968); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335
F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th
Cir. 1964).
185. See Slicker, supra note 2, at 1090-91; Vernon, supra note 26, at 914-15.
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to arbitrate under the predecessor's contract to the existence of a
contractual connection between the two employers would thwart the
accomplishment of industrial peace because the adverse effect on
employees and the likelihood of industrial strife will remain the
same irrespective of whether privity exists.
Implementation of a privity requirement would have the greatest impact in the competitive service industries because of the fre' Since privity obviously does not exist
quent changes of employers. 86
between competitors, employees in industries based on frequently
renewed service contracts awarded through competitive bidding
could not enforce their labor contracts on new employers. Accordingly, the employees either would lose the benefits they had bargained for or would disrupt the industry by striking to maintain
those rights.
As a further basis for refusing to require the successor to honor
the predecessor's contract, the Burns Court expressed the concern
that imposition of the predecessor's agreement would inhibit greatly
the free transferability of assets.'87 The Court reasoned that prospective purchasers would refuse to take over failing companies if they
would be bound by labor contracts that prevented them from reducing labor costs or making structural changes in the business. The
Court's fear is not wholly justified. Imposition of the predecessor's
contract on the new employment relationship may have exactly the
opposite result and may encourage the transfer of capital:
"[Successorship] is a multifaceted concept that, properly applied,
may permit and even facilitate orderly transfers of capital and assets that take due account of appropriate interests of employees and
thus by providing transitions with a minimum of disruption may
advance the cause of industrial peace.""' The new employer would
be assured of the predictability of labor costs and would be guaranteed that no strike, other type of economic unrest or drawn out court
litigation will occur. An employer more probably would hesitate to
purchase a business if a union with bargaining rights existed, but
was not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The employer
would be faced with the certainty of difficult contract negotiations
at the onset of his take-over of the business. Indeed, at least one
arbitrator has suggested that most people purchasing businesses do
186. See Severson & Willcoxon, Successorship Under Howard Johnson: Short Order
Justice for Employees, 64 CAUF. L. Ray. 795, 816-17 (1976).
187. 406 U.S. at 287-88. The same concern was expressed by the court in NLRB v.
Wayne Convalescent Center, Inc., 465 F.2d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 1972).
188. International Ass'n of Machinists Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414 F.2d at 1139 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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so with the expectation that they will acquire the existing labor
contract." 9
Imposition of the existing contract might not impede the transfer of capital because a potential successor could go directly to the
union and bargain with it over the terms of the contract. The buyer
could inform the union that the negotiation of a new labor contract
is a condition precedent to his take over of the business. In the case
of a failing company, with which the Burns Court was most concerned, a union faced with the choice of either accepting new contract terms from a new and prosperous employer or maintaining its
contract with a moribund business quite probably will agree to the
new employer's contract proposals. Having resolved his labor contract worries, the potential successor would be more likely to proceed with the purchase. Therefore, the Court's conclusion that imposition of the predecessor's contract will prevent the transfer of
capital assets is of questionable validity.
It also has been suggested that the Wiley rule would deter corporate acquisitions and mergers because arbitration is expensive
and time consuming and the possibility of a protracted dispute
would discourage a potential buyer. 9 ' This argument is discredited
easily because it reflects an inaccurate view of the arbitration process. Arbitration is an "informal, inexpensive and expeditious"
forum in which to determine the applicability of the predecessor's
contract terms and often serves as a catalyst in the process of
achieving labor peace."1
The Burns Court failed to offer any reason why the unimpeded
transfer of capital should be encouraged at the expense of industrial
stability and employee rights. As one circuit court judge has stated:
[R]ooted in our competitive enterprise system is a strong policy in favor of
free transfer of assets and flexibility of new management attuned to economic
efficiency. This is not, however, an absolute. It must be balanced against the
policies of protection for labor and stability of labor relations that are embod2
ied in the federal labor statutes."9
189. "No rational man buys a manufacturing business today without ascertaining the
facts as to unionization, labor contracts, status of employee relations, and the expectancy
that he probably will acquire the labor contract with the business." Walker Bros., 41 Lab.
Arb. & Disp. Settl. 844, 849 (1963) (Crawford, Arb.),
190. Benetar, Successorship Liability Under LaborAgreements,1973 Wis. L. Ray. 1026,
1031.
191. Patrick, Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers, Collective
Agreements, and Arbitration, 18 S.C.L. Ray. 413, 430-31 (1966); see International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Howmet Corp., 466 F.2d at 1253; United Steelworkers v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d at 153 n.11; Siegel, supra note 31, at 892 n.122.
192. International Ass'n of Machinists Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414 F.2d at 1139 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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A balancing of all these policies in a successor situation weighs in
favor of requiring the successor to arbitrate under his predecessor's
contract because the likelihood of industrial instability is great 9 '
whereas the possibility of inhibiting corporate acquisitions is questionable. The employees' right to bargain with the successor employer also may deter substantially the free transfer of assets, yet
the right to bargain is not sacrificed because of that possibility. The
fruits of the employees' right to bargain should be as well protected
as the right to bargain itself. Accordingly, the fear of impeding the
transfer of capital is an unsatisfactory reason for refusing to bind the
successor to his predecessor's contract.
Equally unpersuasive is the Court's argument that imposing
the predecessor's contract on the new employment relationship
would be inequitable because the union might have made concessions to an economically failing predecessor employer that it would
not have made to a thriving employer.'94 Such an argument is disingenuous. Unions frequently make concessions to borderline or struggling companies in contract negotiations, for it is in the best interest
of all the parties to make sacrifices. At the time a union makes such
concessions, it is surely aware that a merger or sale of assets is a
possibility, especially in the modern business world where such occurrences are commonplace. If the union, in order to achieve stability in its present employment relationship, is willing to take the risk
that later it might be bound by the disadvantageous terms by a new,
more prosperous employer, the Court ought not interfere with the
union's free choice. The union should not be able to take advantage
of a fortuitous change in employers in order to escape contract terms
to which it voluntarily agreed.
Furthermore, labor unions are quite capable of protecting their
own interests in situations calling for concessions to failing employers. A union can negotiate a short term contract so that it will be
bound by the disadvantageous terms for only a short period of time.
Also, a union can insist on an automatic reopening clause or an
automatic arbitration clause, effective upon a change in the identity
of the employer, 9 ' that would permit the modification of substantive contract terms.
The Burns opinion therefore produces an undesirable and legally unjustifiable result. Consequently, Burns should not be read
as invalidating Wiley, but should be discredited as an unsound
193.
194.
195.

See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
406 U.S. at 288.
See Stern, supra note 79, at 38.
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resolution of the question. This conclusion permits affirmative answers to both of the unanswered questions-whether a court may
still order a successor to arbitrate under his predecessor's contract
and whether an arbitrator may impose other substantive terms of
the contract on the successor. Wiley, unaffected by Burns, provides
precedential support for such a conclusion and best accommodates
the national labor policies of achieving industrial stability, freedom
of choice, and minimal government intervention in the employment
relationship.
IV.

ARBITRAL STANDARDS

In the event that an actual arbitration proceeding does result
from a court's order requiring the successor to arbitrate his obligations under his predecessor's contract,' some definite and recognizable standards must be established to guide the arbitrator in resolving the grievances before him. Wiley failed to provide concrete
guidelines,'97 but rather merely expressed confidence in the "flexible
procedures of arbitration""' 8 and suggested that in determining the
effects of the merger on the predecessor's contract the arbitrator
should inquire "whether or not the merger was a possibility considered by Interscience and the Union during the negotiation of the
contract."' 9 9 A few basic precepts have been established, however,
in cases subsequent to Wiley. It is clear that the question of successorship is a question of law for the courts, not the arbitrator, to
decide. Therefore, the court must determine whether the new employer is bound by the predecessor's contract and whether he must
arbitrate under it."' The court may not delegate its responsibility
to determine arbitrability and its determinations may not be re2
viewed by an arbitrator. 1'
196. As has been shown, even when a court orders arbitration, it is unlikely that an
arbitration proceeding will ultimately result. See text accompanying notes 125-31 supra.
197. See Barbash, Status of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Under Wiley v.
Livingston: A Management Counsel's View, 18 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 259, 273 (1966);
Slicker, supra note 2, at 1077.
198. 376 U.S. at 552 n.5.
199. Id. at 557.
200. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52, 66 (2d Cir. 1963) (Kaufman,
J., concurring), aff'd, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Retail Clerks Local 1552 v. Lynn Drug Co., 299 F.
Supp. at 1040; Retail Store Employees Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. at
658; Drivers Local 75 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 29 Wis. 2d 272, 278, 138
N.W.2d 180, 183 (1965); Goldberg, supra note 4, at 772.
201. A determination by the Court that a dispute is arbitrable cannot be frustrated
by a contrary determination of an arbitrator that the Court was in error. To permit an
arbitrator thus to "second-guess" the Court, would seriously disrupt the proper allocation of function and responsibility between the Court and arbitrator as they were formu-
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After finding that a successor is obligated to arbitrate, however,
a court should not express further views on the merits of the union's
claims. 20° The Supreme Court in Wiley purposefully avoided expressing any opinion on the extent to which the substantive terms
of the predecessor's contract bound the successor or on the merits
of the union's grievances. Instead, the Court stated that
"[w]hether or not the Union's demands have merit will be deter21 3
mined by the arbitrator in light of the fully developed facts.
Several courts and commentators have agreed that a court ought
not pass on the merits of union claims by granting specific enforcement of the predecessor's entire contra6t. 14 Accordingly, the
Wackenhut holding that the predecessor's entire labor contract was
binding on the successor215 has been discredited, and the Reliance
opinion2t l 6 has been adopted as the better view.
The arbitrator's role, therefore, is to determine which of the
substantive provisions of the predecessor's contract bind the successor and then to interpret and apply those provisions.2 7 The Wiley
Court left to the arbitrator determination of whether all, only some,
or none of the predecessor's contract provisions should be enforced.20 8 Thus Wiley authorized the arbitrator both to enforce
lated in Wiley. If the mandate of Wiley is to have any meaning at all it is inconceivable
that the arbitrator should possess authority to dilute the Court's ruling by finding the
dispute not arbitrable.
Piano & Musical Instrument Workers Local 2549 v. W.W. Kimball Co., 239 F. Supp. 523,
525 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
202. The courts in both Retail Clerks Local 1552 v. Lynn Drug Co., 299 F. Supp. 1036
(S.D. Ohio 1969), and Retail Store Employees Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F.
Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966), refused to grant specific enforcement of the predecessor's contract because such action would "usurp the function of the arbitrator to whom the Wiley
Court had specifically delegated the responsibility of determining the merits of each situation
and of applying the terms of the surviving contract." Vernon, supra note 26, at 13.
is not our function to
203. 376 U.S. at 555. The circuit court in Wiley noted that "[i]t
express any opinion on the subject, provided the agreement contemplates that such a question or congeries of questions was to be decided by arbitration." 313 F.2d at 59.
204. See Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Nolde Bros., 530 F.2d at 553;
Bath Marine Draftsmen's Ass'n v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 266 F. Supp. at 716; Local 24,
IBEW v. Win. C. Bloom & Co., 242 F. Supp. 421, 428 (D. Md. 1965); Benetar, supra note
190, at 1028; Slicker, supra note 2, at 1077.
205. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
207. See McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 247 F. Supp. 113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
rev 'd on other grounds, 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1966); ContractualSuccessorship, supra note
85, at 631-32.
208. The circuit court in Wiley recognized that ordering the union's grievances to be
resolved through arbitration created the possibility that the arbitrator might decide that none
of the substantive contract terms survived the merger. 313 F.2d at 59. See also Note, Labor
Law: Duty of Employer to Arbitrate with Union Representing Employees of Purchased
Company, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 967, 972 (1966).
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"accrued" rights as well as to impose future obligations on the successor 209 and to formulate a proper remedy through which to implement his decision. 1 °
In determining the extent to which a successor is bound by the
substantive provisions of his predecessor's labor agreement, the arbitrator should establish a presumption that not only the arbitration clause, but also the other terms and conditions of the predecessor's labor contract bind the successor. 21 This presumption is justified by the national labor policy of achieving industrial peace by
protecting employees' contractual rights with a limited intrusion on
free collective bargaining.212 The presumption would be rebuttable
by clear and convincing evidence that the original contracting parties, the predecessor and the union, did not intend that their contract or certain portions of it would bind the successor. 213 The abThe court in Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1974),
determined that after Burns a court still could order a successor to arbitrate under his
predecessor's contract, stating that
[u]pon remand, the district court might determine that the facts of this case warrant
enforcement against BTI of all, some, or none of the ETI-Union contract provisions. For
example, if it is found that that contract was entered into by the Union with the specific
understanding that its terms would not be deemed to survive a sale of the controlling
interest in the corporation, it should not be enforced against BTI.
Id. at 961 n.26. Although the intent of the Union and the predecessor are the appropriate
factors to consider in determining whether a certain contract provision should apply to the
successor (see text accompanying notes 212-14 infra), this determination should be made by
the arbitrator, not by the court as this case suggests. The court should determine only whether
national labor policies require the successor to arbitrate under the predecessor's labor agreement.
209. 376 U.S. at 555. See also Benetar, supra note 190, at 1032.
210. 376 U.S. at 552 n.5. The circuit court in Wiley also acknowledged that the determination of a proper remedy for enforcing the Union's rights would be left to the arbitrator. 313
F.2d at 59.
211. These principles for guiding the arbitrator's application and interpretation of a
predecessor's contract are derived from a previous article by Professor Goldberg. For a full
discussion of the reasoning supporting these principles, see Goldberg, supra note 4, at 772787.
212. Another commentator has suggested that Wiley should be interpreted as implying
a presumption of survival of the predecessor's contract. Slicker, supra note 2, at 1081. The
argument was made in one arbitration case that "if there is sufficient continuity surviving a
change of ownership to justify arbitration, there is sufficient continuity surviving a change
in ownership to justify the application of the substantial terms of the contract to the successor
....
" This argument in effect calls for a presumption of contract survival. Lake States
Leasing Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 935, 938 (1966) (Gundermann, Arb.) (successor
ordered to arbitrate under the predecessor's labor contract by the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board; decision based on other grounds).
213. See Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Nolde Bros., 530 F.2d at 553;
Retail Clerks Local 1552 v. Lynn Drug Co., 299 F. Supp. at 1041. Although conceding that
an arbitrator could determine the intent of the union and the predecessor by "looking to the
scope of the negotiations leading up to the contract or by examining the content of a
Isuccessors and assigns' clause," one commentator criticizes this approach as constituting a
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sence of a "successors and assigns" clause in the predecessor's labor
contract should not be interpreted, however, as establishing a lack
of intent by the original parties to bind a successor to their contract.
In order to avoid obligations under a predecessor's contract, the
successor must demonstrate explicit language clearly indicating
parties agreed not to impose any obligations on a
that the original
24
successor. 1
Contrary to this general approach, however, the arbitrator
should not apply this presumption whenever changed or unforeseen
circumstances would make application of a specific contract term
25
unreasonable or inequitable in the new employment relationship.
When such circumstances arise, the arbitrator should determine
whether to apply the predecessor's agreement in compliance with
considerations of equity and rational industrial policies. 26
"legal fiction" since a labor contract and a "successors and assigns" clause are negotiated
without any knowledge of the circumstances under which a future succession in employers
takes place. Slicker, supra note 2, at 1077-78.
214. We reach this conclusion [that the merger does not terminate the contract]
despite the fact that the agreement contains no statement that its terms are to be
binding on successors and the further fact that neither of the parties had a possible
consolidation in mind when the terms of the agreement were negotiated and settled. Not
only would a contrary rule involve manifest injustice, a circumstance not to be lightly
disregarded or brushed aside, it would be a breeder of discontent and unharmonious
relations between employer and employees and a source of unnecessary and disrupting
litigation.
Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d at 56.
215. Other authorities have agreed that an arbitrator properly may give weight to a
change in circumstances that would result in inequities if certain terms in the predecessor's
contract were binding on the successor. See Boeing Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
504 F.2d at 320 n.19; Morris & Gaus, supra note 5, at 1378; Patrick, Implications of the John
Wiley Case for Business Transfers, Collective Agreements, and Arbitration, 18 S.C.L. REv.
413, 430 (1966); Effect on SuccessorEmployer, supranote 136, at 256-57. In contrast, another
author has stated that
a labor contract is a series of mutually dependent clauses where the quantity of wages
is dependent on the other benefits guaranteed. Thus to permit the arbitrator to have
carte blanche authority to pick and choose which terms survive is to allow the arbitrator
to upset the delicate balance struck by the parties when the contract was made.
Slicker, supra note 2, at 1081. This comment is unjustifiable for several reasons. First, the
arbitrator does not have the right to "pick and choose," but only to refuse to apply contract
terms that would be inequitable in the new circumstances. Also, the arbitrator is the adjudicator best qualified to understand the parties' interests and methods by which to achieve
long-term industrial stability. He would be unlikely to apply the contract so as to disrupt
the balance between the parties and create unrest.
216. One work has stated that it is doubtful if an arbitration award based on equity
and contrary to a contract provision could be enforced, for it would be contra to United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Shaw & Carter, Sales,
Mergers and Union ContractRelations, 19 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 357, 371 (1967). This
is not necessarily true, however, because, "while Enterprise forbids a decision against the
parties' expressed will, it does not require the arbitrator to ignore changed circumstan-
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A comparison of these standards to those actually used in the
two arbitration proceedings that resulted from court orders will
2
demonstrate their viability. In Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 1
the arbitrator found that the substantive provisions of the predecessor's contract were binding on the successor employer until either
"its contract termination date or until there is a change of conditions that altered the separate identity within the new business
enterprise, whichever occurred sooner. 2 18 Noting the national labor
policies relied upon by the Wiley Court in ordering arbitration, the
arbitrator held that a "substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise" would render a collective bargaining agreement as
212
applicable to the new industrial community as it was to the old.
By initiating his analysis of the successor's obligations in this manner, the arbitrator in effect utilized a presumption that continuity
in a business's identity sufficient to support a court order of arbitration is sufficient grounds upon which to bind the successor to the
predecessor's entire labor contract.
The successor employer attempted in Interscience to argue that
past negotiations in which a union unsuccessfully attempted to include a "successors and assigns" clause in the contract would prove
the parties' intent not to impose their labor agreement on successor
employers. The arbitrator disposed of this argument, asserting that
after Wiley "[i]t [is] immaterial that the Union unsuccessfully
'2
sought to get by contract what it achieved as a matter of law. 1
This scenario indicates that both the parties and the arbitrator were
following the analysis suggested above. The successor attempted to
show his obligations, or rather his lack of obligations, under the
predecessor's contract by proving the intent of the original bargaining parties. He was unsuccessful in this attempt because he failed
to. establish by clear and convincing evidence an express intent of
ces-even though his decision may be contrary to the literal terms of the agreement." Goldberg, supra note 4, at 782.
One equitable consideration to be applied in determining whether the successor should
be bound to certain terms of the predecessor's contract is whether the predecessor still exists,
able to fulfill some of the contractual obligations. The courts in Howard Johnson and in
Lane's of Findlay used this consideration to distinguish those cases from Wiley. Their decisions not to order the successor to arbitrate were based in part on this fact. 417 U.S. at 253;
260 F. Supp. at 659. This factor is more appropriately applied in an arbitrator's determination
whether a specific contract term binds a successor than in a court's determination whether a
successor should be bound to arbitrate.
217. 55 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 210 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.). This was the arbitration
proceeding that resulted from the Court's order in Wiley.
218. Id. at 218.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 220.
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the original parties not to bind him to their agreement. The arbitrator further acknowledged that the absence of a "successors and
assigns" clause is in itself insufficient to overcome the presumption,
of
imposing the substantive terms of
which recognizes the benefits 22
1
successor.
the
on
the contract
In the second case, United States Gypsum Co., 222 the arbitrator
was asked to resolve grievances based in part upon assertions that
the successor company had refused to recognize and comply with
the predecessor's contract, had failed to deduct union dues and to
221. The arbitrator found that the predecessor's contract was binding on the successor
only for the approximately four months from the date of the merger to the time the former
Interscience employees were transferred to the Wiley plant and integrated with the Wiley
employees. The arbitrator felt that as long as the former Interscience employees remained at
the Interscience plant and performed their old jobs, their status as a separate, continuing
enterprise justified imposing the contract on the successor. The arbitrator found, however,
that when the former Interscience employees were transferred to the Wiley plant they became
a "minority accretion" to the Wiley employee unit. At that time the union ceased to be the
employees' exclusive bargaining representative and the agreement between the union and the
predecessor was no longer enforceable. Id. at 218.
What apparently happened, in effect, is that the arbitrator felt he had the right and
responsibility to re-examine the question of successorship previously resolved by the Court
in Wiley. See Abodeely, supra note 4, at 516-20. "The same considerations which were employed to find an accretion were also used to prove the absence of a successor relationship."
Id. at 516. The Supreme Court found in Wiley that the substantial continuity of identity in
the Interscience enterprise necessary for Wiley to be a successor existed even though the
former Interscience employees and the Wiley employees were functionally integrated. In
direct contradiction, the arbitrator found that no continuity of identity in the Interscience
enterprise existed after the merger of employees had occurred and, accordingly, that Wiley's
successorship and the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement terminated at the time
of the merger.
The question of who made the proper determination regarding the existence of a substantial continuity in the identity of Interscience is immaterial. The important point is that the
arbitrator in Intersciencemisperceived his function and infringed upon the role of the courts
by assuming the right to determine the question of successorship. The Court already had
exercised its function appropriately by finding Wiley to be a successor and by ordering Wiley
to arbitrate under the Interscience contract. The arbitrator's duty was solely to decide which
contract terms applied to the successor. A decision failing to apply contract terms could have
been based properly either on the parties' intent or on inequities resulting from such an
application, but a finding that the contract did not apply because Interscience no longer had
a separate identity was inappropriate.
In accordance with his decision that the predecessor's contract was no longer enforceable
after the integration of the two employee groups, the arbitrator required Wiley to honor the
accrued seniority rights, job security provisions, and accrued vacation benefits from the time
of the corporate merger to the date on which the Interscience employees were moved to the
Wiley plant. No obligations were imposed on Wiley regarding the union's welfare and pension
fund claims because an accord and satisfaction had been reached on those claims. No duties
were imposed under the severance pay provisions because the union and the successor had
agreed to a new severance formula during their private negotiations.
222. 56 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 363 (1971) (Valtin, Arb.). This was the arbitration
proceeding that resulted from the court order in United States Gypsum Co. v. United
Steelworkers.
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recognize seniority rights in accordance with the contract, and had
refused to abide by a provision for reopening negotiations for a wage
increase and paid holidays by refusing to recognize or deal with
union representatives. 22 Relying heavily upon Wiley, Reliance, and
Wackenhut, the arbitrator held that the successor employer was
bound by the predecessor's entire labor contract. Based upon his
reading of Reliance and Wackenhut, the arbitrator adopted a pre224
sumption that the agreement be applied to the successor.
The arbitrator found that Gypsum had violated the union dues
check-off provision and ordered the company to pay with interest
to the union the amount of the dues that should have been checked
off. Furthermore, the arbitrator held that the company was obligated to pay the dues without deducting anything from the employees' wages, since the company had prevented the union from rendering full representation by depriving it of its dues and because too
many administrative difficulties would arise in billing former employees. 21 The company also was found in violation of the contract
for refusing to negotiate with the union over wage increases and
holiday benefits under the reopener provision. The arbitrator declined to order the parties to negotiate under the reopener clause
because the union had been decertified four years earlier. Equally
unacceptable to the arbitrator, however, was the prospect of the
company's wrongdoing going unremedied. With great hesitation,
the arbitrator ordered the company to pay retroactive wages in the
amount that he determined the parties would have agreed upon had
negotiations taken place. With regard to holiday benefits, he ordered no corrective action because he had determined that no gain
would have been achieved through negotiations. The arbitrator,
however, did order the company to pay a retroactive wage increase
plus interest to all current employees and to those employed during
22
the violation.

In an action to enforce the arbitrator's award, the district court
reversed that portion of the award requiring the company to pay a
retroactive wage increase. 227 The court held that the arbitrator's
remedy, based as it was on his determination of what the parties
would have agreed to had negotiations taken place "had the result
of the arbitrator's making a new contract .
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

. .

[and] violates the

Id. at 367.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 392-94.
United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 339 F. Supp. at 307.
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principle enunciated in H.K. Porter . . . ." In addition, the court
modified that part of the order requiring the company to pay the
uncollected dues to the union. The court held that it was proper to
penalize the company by making it pay the dues of former employees, but held that requiring the company to do the same for its
present employees would cause Gypsum to violate section 302(a) of
the LMRA. Accordingly, the order was amended to permit Gypsum
2
to withhold dues from its present employees' future wages.1
On appeal, the circuit court reversed both of the district court's
modifications and ordered enforcement of the arbitrator's original
award. 20 In upholding the wage increase order, the court emphasized the arbitrator's flexibility in formulating remedies and held
that the nexus between the breach of the reopener clause and the
remedy was "sufficient to support the conclusion that the remedy
'draws its essence' from the contract. ' 31 The company had deprived
the union of its right to renegotiate for increased wages. Thus a
remedy that provides what the employees would have received had
no breach occurred is not arbitrary or capricious, but rather is a
logical remedy for the breach. Indeed, in this case the arbitrator's
award was the only approach available by which to remedy the
breach. The court also found that neither the holding nor the rationale of H. K. Porterapplied to this situation because Porter dealt with
the imposition of a substantive contract provision upon negotiating
parties, while this case involved the imposition of a remedy intended to relieve a breach of an already existing collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the court reinstated that portion of the
arbitrator's award requiring the company to pay uncollected dues
to the union without reimbursement from present employees. According to the court, section 302(a) of the LMRA was intended to
"protect employers from extortion and to insure honest, uninfluenced representation of employees" and, therefore, would not be
2 32
violated by such an order.
The arbitrator in Gypsum adhered to the recommended guidelines regarding the application of the predecessor's contract to the
successor by applying a presumption of continued survival for the
entire contract. Gypsum demonstrates to a greater degree an arbitrator's application of equitable considerations and industrial policies in formulating an effective remedy. The arbitrator recognized
228. Id.
229.
230.

Id. at 308.
United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1974).

231.

Id. at 731.

232.

Id. at 734.
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that the union had lost more than interest by being deprived of its
members' dues for a long time. The arbitrator's ability to perceive
this fact was based on his understanding of the industry's working
conditions. The equitable powers of the arbitrator enabled him to
fashion a remedy that compensated for this additional loss by prohibiting the employer from withholding the amount of the dues from
the employees' wages. Furthermore, the arbitrator based his wage
increase order on the "median, nationwide, collectively bargained
wage increase for all industries.113 3 This method of computation
assured an equitable result for both the employees and the employer, but was an approach available only because of the inherent
flexibility of the arbitration process.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the future, courts should find that, despite the Burns decision, the national labor policies expressed in Wiley require them to
order successor employers to arbitrate under their predecessor's contract. Such a holding will best achieve the national labor policy of
preserving industrial peace by protecting employees' contractual
rights and by settling labor disputes through arbitration rather than
through economic warfare. Furthermore, these goals are achieved at
the cost of only a minimal interference with the free collective bargaining process.
The Burns decision should be rejected as a barrier to requiring
a successor to arbitrate under the predecessor's labor agreement
because sound policy considerations and persuasive legal reasoning
militate against its conclusions. Burns was based upon an erroneous
application of section 8(d) and that section's prohibitions against
infringing on free collective bargaining. The opinion's requirement
that collective bargaining occur at the onset of the new employment
relationship can only result in economic unrest and industrial instability.
Finally, to best effectuate the goals of Wiley, an arbitrator, in
applying a predecessor's contract to a successor, should apply a
presumption that the entire contract survives the change of employer. This presumption should be rebuttable only by a showing of
the original parties' express intent that their contract not bind a
successor or by a demonstration that inequity would result because
of changed circumstances.
233.

56 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. at 393.

